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Violence has plagued the westernmost region o f Sudan, known as Darfur, since 
2003. The conflict contains elements o f political and ethnic divisiveness, desertification, 
and resource scarcity. The violence there continues to date. Many have declared 
genocide in Darfur while others maintain that the conflict is instead a crime against 
humanity. The labeling o f the conflict is critical because this process determines the 
interventions available. This paper focuses on the decision-making process o f  the United 
Nations and its Security Council to determine if  the labeling o f  the conflict impacted the 
discourse and intervention decisions by those bodies. Discourse analysis results indicate 
that the labeling did impact intervention decisions and that realpolitik played a large role 
in the discourse and decision-making o f the UN Security Council in relation to Darfur. 
Most importantly, labeling the events in Darfur as crimes against humanity and war 
crimes permitted the UN and its Security Council to circumvent the intervention mandate 
in the Genocide Convention. Finally, the paper suggests that the variable realpolitik be 
added to the integrated theory o f  state crime model to bridge the gap between the 
criminological and international relations theories in order to better describe and explain 
state reaction to the state criminality o f other states.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Sudan lies on the western shore o f the Red Sea in eastern, sub-Saharan Africa (see 
Figure 1). It was colonized by the United Kingdom in 1916 through indirect rule 
(Mullins and Rothe 2007; 2008; Prunier 2005), which meant that few major changes were 
made in the manner in which the government ran. There were important consequences o f 
Colonialism, however. One such issue was the diversion o f the flow o f resources through 
the capital, Khartoum (Mullins and Rothe 2007; 2008; Prunier 2005), because as funds 
and resources were funneled through, the economic benefits from Colonization remained
Figure 1. Map o f Sudan with Darfur and South Sudan Regions Noted.
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Source: Geographic Travels (2011) (see also Appendix C)
in and around the capital city and the Northern Province. This left other parts o f the 
country in distress and poverty as Khartoum prospered (Mullins and Rothe 2007; 2008; 
Prunier 2005). Although Sudan gained independence in the 1950s, the country has been 
plagued by intermittent violence. Since 2003, much o f the violence has been, and 
remains, concentrated in the westernmost region o f  Sudan known as Darfur, whose 
violent roots o f conflict lie in this division o f income and resources that remains from 
Colonial times (Mullins and Rothe 2007; 2008; Prunier 2005).
Along with resource deprivation, the Darfuri conflict also contains an ethnic 
element (Mullins and Rothe 2007; 2008; Prunier 2005). The northern part o f Sudan, 
including Khartoum, was traditionally populated by tribes that identified themselves as 
Arab, while Darfuri tribes traditionally identified themselves as African (Mullins and 
Rothe 2007; 2008). Despite this, the various tribes coexisted in peace and any conflicts 
that erupted were resolved amicably. The African and Arab tribes intermarried in this 
region for many centuries (Mullins and Rothe 2008). However, politicians running for 
office in the late 1960s began to utilize a discourse o f  separation and difference that 
created a fracture between the Arab and African ethnicities (Mullins and Rothe 2007) that 
led to African tribes supporting one candidate and Arabs another. This rhetoric was then 
used to maintain the central power and resources in the capital, which led to the neglect 
o f  Darfur (and other regions) and consequently furthered the divide between the tribes 
identifying themselves as Arab and those identifying themselves as African (Mullins and 
Rothe 2007). This divisiveness laid the groundwork for violence between those creating 
the marginalization and those who were marginalized. In fact:
[Darfur] is widely regarded as the first genocide o f  the twenty-first
century: the deliberate slaughter -  as well as a slower death through
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displacement, starvation, thirst, and disease -  o f more than 450,000 people 
from three tribes (the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit) in the Darfur region o f 
Sudan. (Markusen 2009:95)
Hundreds o f  thousands have been murdered and displaced. The United Human Rights
Council (2013) estimates 400,000 killed and 2.5 million displaced by the conflict. O f the
6 million in the region, 4.7 million have been impacted by the violence (United Human
Rights Council 2013).
Although many states and the United Nations (UN) have provided humanitarian 
aid, the violence rages on. As one o f  the major institutions o f  social control, the UN is 
charged with addressing conflicts between states and other matters. More recently, this 
organization has been called upon to address internal state conflicts that do not cross 
international borders, as well (Claude 1996; Evans et al. 2001; Ruggie 2010). In fact, the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the permanent international body tasked with 
“maintenance o f  international peace and security” (United Nations N.d.). With no 
evidence o f  cessation o f  violence in Darfur, one must question: why has the UN stayed 
the course o f humanitarian intervention? Are there specific duties or responsibilities for 
states and international institutions o f  social control in the face o f  massive loss o f life and 
violations o f  human rights? How do states and international institutions o f social control 
define these conflicts resulting in human rights abuses, death, and displacement?
Despite a vast body o f research focused on Darfur, relatively little has addressed 
the definitional component o f the conflict— genocide versus crimes against hum anity1—
1 The major differentiation between crimes against humanity and genocide is the intent 
behind the execution o f the violence. Genocide is a crime that intends to exterminate a 
group based on a shared characteristic and is systematic in this desire to eliminate said 
group. Alternately, crimes against humanity may involve similar acts o f violence but 
lacks the intent required for genocide.
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and the repercussions that accompany these labels. The definition o f  the situation is vital 
because these labels dictate the array o f interventions available. In fact, genocide is 
unique in international law because it is the only crime that requires intervention in 
accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f  the 
Crime o f Genocide (United Nations 1948) (see next chapter for a detailed explanation). 
This work focuses on this labeling process o f  the conflict in Darfur to understand the 
international political response and the decision-making processes o f the UNSC and its 
permanent member states (P5) in relation to intervention in the conflict.
The conflict in Darfur has sparked much attention, as have the interventions 
applied to the conflict. There is an abundance o f scholarly literature available regarding 
the prolonged hostilities. For example, law scholars have analyzed the conflict from a 
legalistic perspective (e.g., Happold 2006; Jafari and Williams 2005; Williams et al.
2004), while political science scholars have focused on the state and international politics 
impacting the continued violence (e.g., Collier 2008; Heinze 2007). Intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) such as the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU; 
formerly known as the Organization for African Unity), as well as nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) including Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International 
(Al), have also written reports documenting various aspects o f the conflict. These 
writings include information regarding displacement, victimization, specific events 
occurring as the violence continues, peace talks, and aid that has been sent to the region 
(e.g., Amnesty International 2009; Human Rights Watch 2004; 2005a; b; 2006a; b; c; d; 
2008a; b; Organization for African Unity 2004a; b; 2005; United Nations 20051; 2008j). 
Overall, however, this body o f literature neglects the definitional labeling o f  the conflict.
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Due to the importance o f  genocide in international law, one would expect 
criminological literature related to the conflict in Darfur to explore the labeling process 
and associated repercussions. Yet, criminological literature has essentially ignored this 
facet o f  the conflict with a few notable exceptions (i.e., Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 
2009; Heinze 2007; Jafari and Williams 2005; Mullins and Rothe 2007; Rothe and 
Mullins 2007; Straus 2005). Each o f  these will be discussed at length in the literature 
review. In addition to the four criminological analyses o f the labeling process, there are 
three in other disciplines that focus on the labeling o f  the conflict: Jafari and Williams 
(2005), Heinze (2007), and Williams and colleagues (2004). These works analyze the 
content o f  the discourse related to Darfur in relation to the labeling o f the conflict but do 
so through a legal or politico-legal framework.
Legal and political analyses are only two o f the many approaches taken to study 
the conflict in Darfur and the associated definition o f  the situation. Using a historical 
analysis to study the conflict in Darfur and it similarities/differences to previous 
genocides is helpful in understanding the origin o f  such conflicts. However, historical 
analysis will not get at the heart o f  this work, which seeks to understand why effective 
intervention has not been implemented to stem the violence. Because intervention has 
not occurred in response to previous genocide events, historical analyses fall short. 
Political science analyses also fail to reach an understanding o f  intervention decisions 
because they center on governments and state organizations alone. International 
relations, which is a branch o f political science, is a major contributor to this work but 
does not allow for a holistic understanding o f the decision-making process because it 
does not ask how and why such decisions are made. Focusing solely on the decisions o f
6
the UN and member states removes the gravity and importance o f understanding those 
decisions in the context o f the millions o f lives impacted by these egregious crimes. In 
fact, genocide has often been identified as the crime o f all crimes, thus placing it directly 
in the scope o f criminology.
Criminological analysis permits a concurrent study o f the crime itself, as well as 
the measures undertaken to prevent or stop the violence. It is here that a more holistic 
understanding o f the conflict in Darfur may be found. It is this lens through which the 
following research questions will be addressed: do those tasked with intervention in the 
Genocide Convention circumvent that responsibility? If  so, what justifications are used?
It is crucial to determine if  these decisions are influenced by what has been 
described as realpolitik2. Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009), Mullins and Rothe 
(2007; 2008), Rothe and Mullins (2007) have provided criminological case studies on the 
conflict and discussed intervention and realpolitik in brief. However, there is a gap in 
this literature because o f a lack o f criminological studies focusing on the decision-making 
process o f the UNSC and its member states in relation to genocide intervention. No 
previous works have delved into this process and applied criminological theory to 
understanding the how and why o f  decision-making related to Darfur. Further, I seek to 
determine how and why particular interventions, including the use o f force, have been 
avoided. It is here that this work is vital in filling gaps in the existing literature. Most
2 The term realpolitik was coined by August Ludwig von Rochau (1972 [1853]) and is 
defined as a state’s own self interest. “Nation-states pursue their own national interests 
and conceive these national interests primarily in terms o f power” (Totten 2013:7-8). 
National Security Council Paper Number 68 (National Security Council 1950) 
established the three components now commonly attributed to realpolitik: political 
interests, military interests, and economic interests.
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importantly, 1 seek to understand why the cries o f “never again” related to genocide3 
remain empty promises. To do so, I focus on the UN conflict intervention decision­
making process.
Conflict intervention falls under the purview o f the United Nations as the major 
agent o f international social control and provider o f  international peace and security. To 
that end, the UN has implemented mechanisms that seek to prevent a host o f  prohibited 
behaviors that include wars o f aggression, violence against women, and violations o f 
human rights, among others. The crime o f genocide is prohibited through the UN 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the Crime o f Genocide (1948).
Prior to delving into discussions o f  genocide and international violence, Chapter 
II reviews the foundational and relevant literature. Chapter III proceeds with the 
theoretical foundations that inform this work, including Rothe’s (2009b) integrated 
theory o f  state crime, realism, and realpolitik. Chapter IV details the methods employed 
in this research. Chapter V provides a brief narrative o f Sudan and the events occurring 
in Darfur. Chapter VI contains the data findings. Chapter VII contains the theoretical 
analysis. Finally, Chapter VIII explains the policy implications, future directions for 
research, and conclusion.
3 After the Holocaust, many cried “never again” would genocide occur. This has been 
the cry before, during, and after every genocide. In fact, Power (N.d.: 1) called this “the 
world’s most unfulfilled promise.”
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Language and discourse are used daily to express ideology, execute personal 
interactions, and explain complex situations. This may be done through speech, writing, 
electronic communication, the media, and hundreds o f other outlets for communication. 
This language and discourse is often seen as merely a method o f interaction, leaving its 
deeper meanings and latent implications overlooked. Bourdieu ([1982] 2003:2) explains 
that:
everyday linguistic exchanges [are] situated encounters between agents endowed 
with socially structured resources and competencies, in such a way that every 
linguistic interaction... bears the traces o f the social structure that it both expresses 
and helps to reproduce.
An examination o f the discourse used to describe events, conflicts, emotions, political
positions, and millions o f  other concepts is critical to truly understanding what the
originator is not only saying  or writing, but also what may be implied  or assumed  through
the discourse itself. In fact, Bourdieu ([1982] 2003:164) explains that language may be a
form o f “symbolic pow er... that invisible power which can be exercised only with the
complicity o f those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they
themselves exercise it.” It is for these reasons that an analysis o f  the discourse and words
used to describe the conflict in Darfur may shed light on the latent factors underlying the
decision-making process.
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THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION AND ITS OBLIGATIONS
Labeling the situation a crime against humanity rather than genocide impacts how 
the conflict is defined, understood, perceived, and identified by those in power. Labeling 
dictates possible interventions available to address the situation. Understanding the 
events and intervention decisions in Darfur requires some discussion o f genocide and the 
unique mechanisms o f social control at the international level in response to this crime. 
Genocide1 may be generally defined as the systematic killing o f  individuals based on a 
shared characteristic and seeks to intentionally eliminate the entire group exhibiting that 
characteristic. These behaviors were evident in the genocide that occurred during the 
Holocaust, which served as the impetus to the creation o f  the Genocide Convention. This 
work centers on obligations engendered by becoming party to the Genocide Convention.
1 Genocide was codified in The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f  the 
Crime o f  Genocide (UNGC; also known simply as the Genocide Convention). The 
Convention was approved by the UN in 1948 and became enforceable in January 1951 
(1948).
The Genocide Convention defines genocide as:
Article 1. The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in 
time o f peace or in time o f war, is a crime under international law which they 
undertake to prevent and to punish.
Article 11. In the present Convention, genocide means any o f the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or 
religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members o f the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members o f the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions o f life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children o f the group to another group.
Article III. The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide. (United Nations 1948)
1 0
These responsibilities take two forms: those o f  individual states and those at the
international level. These are separate and distinct debates that require discussion.
Article 1 o f the Genocide Convention indicates that parties, which are individual
states, bear some responsibility to “prevent and punish” genocide (United Nations 1948).
However, these individual responsibilities are by no means straightforward. Some
suggest that individual states bear the burden o f  protection from genocide while others
deny that such an intervention responsibility exists. Kelly (2007-2008:159) sums the
debate up by detailing:
[t]wo schools o f thought are form ing...The non-interventionist school denies a 
legal duty based on a plain reading o f the Genocide Convention. This school 
admits, however, the moral and political responsibility, and even advocates 
undertaking all other actions short o f  military intervention (economic sanctions, 
embargoes, etc.). The option o f  intervention is also on the table, under a newly 
developed theory o f a sovereignty waiver if  states commit genocide against their 
own people. Whether or not to exercise that option is in the discretion o f each 
state. Meanwhile, the interventionist school is a natural outgrowth o f the post-war 
human rights movement. This school holds that a duty to intervene arises once 
genocide has been determined, and states with the capacity to act that do not do so 
are in breach o f  an international legal obligation. Widespread acceptance o f  
humanitarian intervention by states, as well as the U.N. leadership in the 1990’s, 
forms the basis for this school’s underlying theory. Coupled with widespread 
acknowledgement that Rwanda’s genocide was preventable (followed by the 
public contrition by states, including the United States), this school relies heavily 
on the moral and political weight o f 800,000 dead Rwandans to buttress its legal 
argument.
Further, Toope (2006:189) explains the prevention o f genocide as, “an erga omnes 
obligation...of such importance to the international community that all states have a care 
towards its fulfillm ent.. .individual states are burdened with a duty under customary law 
to enforce the obligation.” Both sides o f  the debate do acknowledge some sort of 
individual state responsibility inherent in the Convention (Kelly 2007-2008). However,
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the two schools o f  thought differ greatly in terms o f  appropriate intervention, specifically 
in relation to the use o f military force.
Those believing that individual states are tasked with military intervention explain 
that such intervention is required by the Convention. For example, Brunnee (2007:50) 
states that:
each State has a legal obligation to participate in protective efforts... As we have 
seen, the Draft Articles are careful in sketching out the measures that individual 
States can take in the name o f collective concern, especially as far as the use o f 
force is concerned. Here, the concept o f responsibility to protect clarifies that, in 
cases o f  extreme crisis, the duty to cooperate to bring an end to grave human 
rights abuses does extend to military measures.
Brunnee (2007) is only one example o f those who conceptualize individual state
responsibility as encompassing a use o f force component —  but this individual use o f
force is far from commonly understood under the Genocide Convention.
Militaristic intervention aside, an accepted legal norm o f individual state
responsibility leaves several questions unanswered. Exactly how or when should such an
intervention occur? Is every state responsible to intervene? How would that work in
practice?
Although the Convention is very ambiguous in respect to individual state 
intervention (e.g., Fowler 2006; Kelly 2007-2008), the United States (US) must have 
perceived some intervention responsibility because politicians danced around use o f the 
genocide descriptor in relation to Rwanda (e.g., Kagan 2006; Power 2002; N.d.). Power 
(2001:6) explains:
[a] discussion paper on Rwanda, prepared by an official in the Office o f the 
Secretary o f Defense and dated May 1, testifies to the nature o f official thinking. 
Regarding issues that might be brought up at the next interagency working group, 
it stated[:] Genocide Investigation: Language that calls for an international 
investigation o f human rights abuses and possible violations o f the genocide
1 2
convention. Be Careful. Legal at State was worried about this yesterday—  
Genocide finding could commit [the U.S. government] to actually "do something. " 
[Emphasis added.]
This US policy document confirms that there may be some obligation perceived,
although the level or requirements o f  such responsibility remains ambiguous.
If  intervention by individual states is so ambiguous as to prevent action, then the
explicit responsibility to intervene in cases o f genocide must fall to some organization at
the international level. In fact, the Convention (1948) specifically delineates this
responsibility to “competent organs o f  the United Nations to take such action under the
Charter o f the United Nations” which may only be understood as the UNSC2.
If the UNSC is ultimately tasked with genocide intervention under the
Convention, what interventions are required? Current UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon (N.d.) outlined the intervention obligations o f both individual states and the UN:
[a]t the [UN World] Summit, world leaders also agreed that when any State fails to 
meet that responsibility all States (the “international community”) are responsible for 
helping to protect peoples threatened with such crimes and that they should first use 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful methods. Then, if  peaceful methods are 
inadequate and if  national authorities are “manifestly failing” to protect their 
populations, they should act collectively in a “timely and decisive manner” -  through 
the UN Security Council and in accordance with the Charter o f the UN -  by using 
force.
Power (2002:504) calls this progression the “continuum o f intervention.” This 
continuum may be conceptualized as least-aggressive interventions on one end, such as 
humanitarian aid (Jones 2006), moving to mid-range actions, such as sanctions (Jones 
2006), and ending with the most aggressive, epitomized by militaristic force (Jones
2 The UNSC is comprised o f five permanent members, known as the “Big Five” or 
“Permanent Five”: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom o f Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States o f  America, along with ten rotating 
members on terms o f two years each (United Nations Security Council N.d.).
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2006). Ki-moon (N.d.) provides more detail in stating that prevention o f genocide is
vital. To that end, UN Peacekeepers may be called upon to intervene. These
peacekeepers may be charged with a variety o f  tasks, including disarmament, protection,
and situation monitoring. Once all peaceful mechanisms have proven unfruitful, Ki-
moon (N.d.) states that the next step is to “take swift action, including the use o f  military
force.” Lippman (2008:428) elaborates:
the international community through the United Nations has the responsibility to 
protect populations from genocide. This entails an obligation to take collective 
action through the Security Council under Chapters VI and VII ‘should peaceful 
means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations from genocide.’
Use o f force and security decisions rest solely in the hands o f the UNSC and are at the
center o f  many intervention debates.
The UN Charter (1945) specifies that nonprocedural issues require nine favorable
votes by members o f  the UNSC, including all five permanent members. Overt use o f
force without permission o f  the sitting state government for protection o f civilians is not
codified in the United Nations Charter. However, the UN has acknowledged and
accepted such responsibility in the World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) and
embedded authorization to employ such force in the UN Charter Chapter VII mandate
governing the use o f force:
[w]e [the UN] reaffirm that the relevant provisions o f the Charter are sufficient to 
address the full range o f threats to international peace and security. We further 
reaffirm the authority o f the Security Council to mandate coercive action to 
maintain and restore international peace and security. (United Nations 
2005a:Paragraph 79)
Acknowledgement o f a responsibility to protect aside, intervention into intrastate conflict 
remains under much debate internationally.
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The Genocide Convention (1948:Article 8) specifies that intervention is 
warranted and that, “[a]ny Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs o f  the 
United Nations to take such action under the Charter o f the United Nations as they 
consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression o f acts o f genocide.” The UN 
organization referenced here is the Security Council. Although signatory states may 
request that the UNSC intervene in cases o f genocide, the UNSC itself is required to act 
to prevent or punish genocide. In fact, genocide holds a unique place in international law 
as it is the only crime that triggers a required  intervention by the UNSC through Article 1 
o f the UNGC (1948): “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether 
committed in time o f peace or in time o f war, is a crime under international law which 
they undertake to prevent and to punish.” By authoring the document, the UN is the 
primary contracting party and thus duly bound to this responsibility through the 
appropriate mechanism to address the problem: the UNSC.
The intervention responsibility, however, has been circumvented as evidenced in 
the more recent cases o f genocide (e.g., Rwanda, Yugoslavia). In response to this 
inaction, an international panel o f scholars convened the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). They focused on a central question: “the so- 
called ‘right o f humanitarian intervention’: when, if  ever, it is appropriate for states to 
take coercive— and in particular military— action against another state for the purpose o f 
protecting people at risk in that other state” (Evans et al. 2001 :vii). The ICISS report 
(Evans et al. 2001) situates intervention within the context o f a state’s duty to protect its 
citizens. If the state does not, or is not willing to, execute this responsibility, the 
international political community is tasked with providing protection to the citizens o f
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said state. The responsibility to protect (R2P) entails three components: “the 
responsibility to prevent[,]... the responsibility to react[,]... and the responsibility to 
rebuild” (Evans et al. 2001 :xi). Finally, this responsibility to protect is structured in a tri­
level hierarchy: the first line o f defense belongs to the state involved; the second with 
“domestic authorities acting in partnership with external actors” ; and lastly and 
ultimately, with the states o f the world both individually and collectively (Evans et al. 
2001:49).
This emerging responsibility to protect doctrine is important to the Darfur case 
because it is central to understanding the intervention decision discourse. This is a major 
concern o f  this study because the responsibility to protect doctrine entails a legal, ethical, 
and moral responsibility to intervene in cases o f genocide, crimes against humanity, or 
war crimes where the state does not provide adequate protection o f  its citizens (Evans et 
al. 2001). This responsibility is collectively shouldered by every state (United Nations 
2004x). Such intervention may take the form o f aid for victims or, as a last resort, the use 
o f military force (Evans et al. 2001). To date, the R2P has not been codified into 
international law and, thus, is not binding (Luck 2010; Mennecke 2009) “but is often 
described as ‘evolving’ in that direction” (Mennecke 2009:170).
The responsibility to protect against genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity was embraced internationally at the 2005 UN World Summit (Hubert 2010) 
and in the World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) (United Nations 2005a). It was 
also confirmed by the UNSC in 2006 (United Nations Security Council 2006). Both 
former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan and current Secretary-General Ban
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Ki-moon are major supporters o f the responsibility to protect and have sought to bring
international attention and acceptance to the concept. Ki-moon (2007:1) stated that:
[a]ll the world’s Governments have agreed in principle to the responsibility to 
protect. Our challenge now is to give real meaning to the concept, by taking steps 
to make it operational. Only then will it truly give hope to those facing genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Preventing genocide is 
a collective and individual responsibility. Everyone has a role to play: 
Governments, the media, civil society organizations, religious groups, and each 
and every one o f us. Let us build a global partnership against genocide. Let us 
protect populations from genocide when their own Government cannot or will 
not.
This acceptance o f  the responsibility to protect those unprotected or harmed by their own 
govemment(s) is inherent in the Genocide Convention and the responsibility to protect 
doctrine and falls under the mandate o f the United Nations and its Security Council, as a 
primary agents o f  international social control.
The Genocide Convention and responsibility to protect doctrine are important 
international instruments aimed at protecting civilians and preventing genocide; both are 
very idealistic. Thus, it is important to understand how these protection mechanisms 
work realistically versus theoretically. To that end, the following section focuses on the 
manner in which the conflict in Darfur has been previously analyzed. It also includes a 
section on realpolitik, which is hypothesized to influence intervention decisions in this 
case.
LITERATURE ON THE LABELING OF THE DARFURI CONFLICT
The authors contributing to the discourse o f the conflict in Darfur have taken 
different perspectives. The vast majority o f  these works are case studies that center on 
the origin o f the conflict and the underlying causes o f the continuing violence. However,
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few works differentiate the conflict itself from the discourse used to describe the conflict. 
These are, in fact, separate and distinct concerns. There are only seven works that focus 
on the labeling and associated repercussions o f such labels (Hagan and Rymond- 
Richmond 2009; Heinze 2007; Jafari and Williams 2005; Mullins and Rothe 2007; 2008; 
Rothe and Mullins 2007; Williams et al. 2004).
Three o f these seven discourse-focused works are outside o f  the field o f 
criminology. Jafari and Williams (2005) center their discussion on the labeling o f  the 
conflict from a legal perspective and frame the conflict in terms o f the legal ramifications 
o f these labels. Heinze (2007), however, analyzes these conflicts from a political 
perspective. Jafari and Williams (2005) seek to challenge the UN’s Report on the 
International Commission o f Inquiry into Darfur (RICID) determination that “in some 
instances individuals, including government officials, may commit acts with genocidal 
intent,” while abstaining from defining the conflict itself as genocide due to a lack o f 
intent to exterminate the Darfuri (see Chapter VI for a detailed analysis o f this report).
The authors explain that the UN report determined that the “intent was to ‘drive victims 
from their homes for the purposes o f counter-insurgency warfare’” (Jafari and Williams
2005). The authors compare the situation in Darfur to Rwanda, which was retroactively 
defined as genocide. In order to deconstruct the logic o f the UN ’s determination, they 
compare these two contemporary conflicts. One o f the major concerns identified by 
Jafari and Williams (2005) is that the violence in both Darfur and Rwanda has/d multiple 
roots-causes or goals but that does not disqualify either conflict as genocide. Another 
flaw is that the UN report indicates that there was selective killing with some left alive in 
the targeted villages. These individuals, however, may have later been killed for other
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reasons, such as being accused o f perpetrating crimes. The report indicates that this is a 
lack o f intent, but Jafari and Williams (2005) explain that “secondary motives’" do not 
mitigate the genocide occurring in Darfur or in Rwanda. Jafari and Williams (2005) 
describe the UN’s use o f  “word games” by finding that genocidal acts, but not genocide, 
have occurred in Darfur. Additionally, they state that the reason for these “word games” 
is to circumvent the Genocide Convention’s intervention trigger.
Williams and colleagues (2004) share the position o f Jafari and Williams (2005) 
by stating that the existing conflict in the country is extraneous to a determination o f 
genocide. They explain that the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
faced a similar challenge due to an existing conflict between the Rwandan Armed Forces 
(RAF) and Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). However, the ICTR determined that, “the fact 
that the genocide took place while the RAF was in conflict with the RPF can in no way 
be considered as an extenuating circumstance for it” (as cited in Williams et al. 2004:10). 
They further explain that this is no different than the war between the Sudan Liberation 
Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and does not mean that 
genocide has not occurred.
The use o f this genocide label versus other terminology is also analyzed in 
Heinze’s (2007) work. H einze’s (2007) views are similar to Jafari and Williams (2005) 
in that he focuses on the “word games” related to the genocide while also comparing the 
conflicts in Rwanda and Darfur. Heinze (2007:359) centers his work on the “rhetoric o f 
genocide” and the United States’ refusal to identify genocide in Rwanda despite the 
evidence for doing so. He also focuses on the alternative willingness o f the US to 
proclaim genocide in Darfur with far less supporting evidence at the time. Heinze (2007)
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specifically mentions realpolitik in his narrative in regard to the manner in which the 
Clinton and G.W. Bush administrations approached the definition o f the conflicts in 
Rwanda and Darfur. This is particularly significant, as realpolitik is the variable o f 
interest in this research. Additionally, he takes great care in explaining that the Clinton 
administration did not use the word genocide (instead choosing the label “genocidal 
acts”) because o f the desire to avoid the intervention trigger embedded in the Genocide 
Convention. However, Heinze (2007:373) explains that “original and secondary sources 
on the Genocide Convention now suggest that the treaty does not confer an obligation to 
intervene militarily” (emphasis in original). This implies that international legal scholars 
had developed a different interpretation o f the Genocide Convention during the time 
between the conflicts in Rwanda and Darfur. The Bush administration was then willing 
to state that genocide was occurring in Darfur “without an expectation o f intervention” 
(Heinze 2007:362), as the more recent US interpretation o f the Genocide Convention 
simply requires some sort o f  action to prevent or punish future genocidal acts. In 
September 2004, speeches by both US Secretary o f State Colin Powell (Powell 2004a; b) 
and then President George W. Bush (United Nations 2004i; 2007b; r) identified the acts 
in Darfur as constituting genocide. It was after these statements that the US requested the 
UNSC investigate the situation. It seems to be that this reinterpretation o f  the Genocide 
Convention buttresses Powell’s statement that “some seem to have been waiting for this 
determination o f genocide to take action. In fact, however, no new action is dictated by 
this determination” (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2009:xviii). However, there is much 
international legal scholarship that refutes nonintervention as an acceptable course o f 
action associated with a determination o f genocide as described by Heinze (2007).
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This genocide descriptor is very important to understanding how the terminology 
applied to the conflict dictates the arsenal o f  interventions that may be utilized to address 
the violence. This was discussed in both Jafari and Williams (2005) and Heinze (2007). 
However, they do not situate themselves in the criminological literature as does this 
research.
The four existing works that are situated within the criminological literature 
(Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2009; M ullins and Rothe 2007; 2008; Rothe and Mullins 
2007) discuss, in a cursory manner, realpolitik in relation to the labeling o f  the conflict 
These works do not seek to determine or understand if, how, or why realpolitik may 
influence the labeling o f  the conflict. Nonetheless, these four works remain highly 
relevant because the authors frame the conflict through a criminological lens.
Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009) attempted to determine the number o f 
deaths and displacement that have occurred throughout the course o f the conflict.
Further, they focus on the “flip-flopping” associated with determining whether the crimes 
meet the definitional requirement o f genocide or should be classified as crimes against 
humanity. This work is a major step in advancing the integration o f victimology and 
genocide research, which has been long overlooked by criminology. Victimology in 
humanitarian conflicts has always been a high priority for human rights and aid 
organizations, but rarely have those instruments been used to better understand the 
conflicts from a criminological perspective. The authors also make great strides in 
advancing the study o f the criminology o f  genocide by applying criminological theory to 
the events, resulting in their collective action theory o f genocide. This theory utilizes 
concepts from techniques o f neutralization, anomie, differential association, collective
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efficacy, and opportunity structures (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2009). The theory 
may be summarized as aimed at understanding the “social efficacy by militia leaders in 
mobilizing and organizing genocidal violence as a joint criminal enterprise” (Hagan and 
Rymond-Richmond 2009:136). Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009) do offer 
theoretical insight to the conflict but do not delve into the intricacies o f the conflict 
labeling.
Mullins and Rothe (2007) and Mullins and Rothe (2008) discuss the importance 
o f the label applied to the conflict. Both lay out the case study o f  the Darfuri conflict 
with a historical contextual description o f the conflict and the factors associated with it. 
However, these works differ from Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009) as they advance 
the study o f the conflict by undertaking a discussion o f both individual state and 
international societal repercussions that identifying the conflict as genocide may entail.
In fact, it was a single sentence in Mullins and Rothe (2008:185) that sparked this work: 
“The selection o f terminologies here is critical, both legally and politically.”
Mullins and Rothe (2007) use criminological theory at multiple levels o f analysis 
through the application o f Rothe’s (2006) integrated theory o f state crime’s components 
o f motivations, opportunities, controls, and constraints. Although realpolitik is implied in 
the integrated theory, it is not fully explicated in the work. It is here that this work seeks 
to add to the criminological literature by exploring realpolitik as the variable exerting the 
most influence on the decision-makers within the UNSC both individually and 
collectively.
The fourth and final criminological work on the labeling of the conflict in Darfur 
is Rothe and Mullins (2007). It is this work that is most closely associated with the
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research at hand. The authors detail and define the concepts o f genocide and crimes 
against humanity as laid out in treaty and international law. Further, they deconstruct the 
decision by the UN ’s Commission o f Inquiry into Darfur (UNCID) indicating that the 
conflict is a crime against humanity. There are three central questions that must be 
answered in the affirmative for a determination o f genocide to be made: “ (1) Did the 
actions exist on a widespread and systematic level? (2) Do tribal groups constitute a 
protected population under the genocide and crimes against humanity conventions? (3) 
Was the specific intent o f  destroying an entire category o f persons present?” (Rothe and 
Mullins 2007:20). Each o f the three questions is analyzed at length and the logic o f  the 
UN’s decision is challenged drawing on evidence from the conflict. The authors find that 
the three critical elements for genocide are present. Thus, there must be other reasons to 
apply terminology to the conflict that is neither factually or legally accurate.
Rothe and Mullins (2007) undertake a discussion o f the importance o f  the label 
applied to the conflict and the associated ramifications. They state that “Western powers 
who hold permanent seats in the UNSC, and thereby veto power, developed their own 
strategies and agendas for the continent [of Africa]” (Rothe and Mullins 2007:101). 
Further, President Bill Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 25, “in essence...states 
that the US will be selective in what peacekeeping actions it supports both with its UNSC 
vote and its own troops” (Rothe and Mullins 2007:102). It was these two statements that 
pushed the current work into fruition, and it is here that this research endeavors to situate 
itself in an effort to understand the decision-making process by the United States and 
other members o f the UNSC in relation to intervention in Darfur.
23
It is important to note that these four criminological works centering on Darfur 
(Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2009; Mullins and Rothe 2007; 2008; Rothe and Mullins 
2007) were completed in 2007, 2008, and 2009, a mere four to six years, respectively, 
after the conflict began. However, since 2009, there have been no criminological 
analyses o f  the conflict, now in its eleventh year, and there have been no further attempts 
by criminologists to understand the decision-making process o f states in relation to 
international conflict intervention. It is in this literature gap in which this work is 
situated.
The major contribution o f  this work is to explicitly apply realpolitik to an analysis
o f  the decision-making process o f  the UN and UNSC in relation to Darfur through the
integrated theory o f state crime. State crime may be defined as:
[a]ny action that violates international public law, and/or a state’s own domestic 
law when these actions are committed by individual actors acting on behalf of, or 
in the name o f the state, even when such acts are motivated by their personal 
economical, political, and ideological interests. (Rothe 2009b:6)
Under this definition, the genocide in Darfur is a state crime. Analyses utilizing the
integrated theory o f  state crime have often drawn on realpolitik, as states frequently place
their own legitimacy and self-interests above all else. For example, a state may be
quashing threats to its own legitimacy by executing genocide or crimes against humanity.
State crime has always implicitly considered the economic, military, and political goals
o f states in relation to understanding state criminality. This is not the only application o f
the theory, however.
The integrated theory o f state crime has also been used to understand the reaction
o f states to the state criminality o f  others. I hypothesize that this reaction is influenced by
realpolitik. For example, does the longstanding oil trade relationship between Sudan and
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China mitigate the manner in which China voted in relation to Darfur conflict 
interventions? Could it be that Chinese economic interests may be impacted by certain 
interventions into the conflict? This is an application o f realpolitik-influenced decision­
making that this project hopes to shed light upon. It is also an example by which the 
integrated theory o f  state crime may be used to understand the reaction o f  states to the 
state criminality o f others. Those who have written on the reaction to state criminality 
and have applied realpolitik to the issues are discussed in the following section.
Steinmetz (2012) and Rothe and Steinmetz (2013) analyze the manner in which 
the US reacted to the leaking o f classified information by WikiLeaks and found 
realpolitik to be a factor. The focus on state security and legitimacy at all costs was at the 
root o f  the treatment o f  Private First Class Bradley Manning, the whistleblower in the 
case. This state reaction as seen through the lens o f  realpolitik explains the internal 
decision-making process related to the case. This concept may also be extrapolated to 
illustrate the ways that states react to the criminality o f  other states, as well. These 
individual state reactions by the Permanent Five (P5) on the UNSC are especially 
important in relation to this case.
Several scholars have analyzed the behavior o f the P5 through a lens o f 
realpolitik, finding that it does influence individual decision-making. Logically, 
therefore, realpolitik must also ultimately impact UNSC interventions. In illustration o f 
this point, Forsythe (2012:841) asks critical questions about the use o f realpolitik by the 
UNSC:
[a]re they consistently committed to holding individuals responsible for violations 
o f international law as a feature o f  principled world order after the Cold War? Or 
do their policies reflect mostly varying tactical maneuvers put at the service o f 
expedient notions o f narrow national interests?
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However, Totten (2013:217) sees this as a foregone conclusion: “ [r]ealpolitik, o f  course.
drives decision making at the national and international levels, including at the UNSC
and among the members o f  the P5” (Totten 2013:217). Further, Forsythe (2012:841)
explains that “[i]n much foreign policy, the reality is that political choice drives reference
to law and legal interpretation. Thus, many analysts conclude that the Security Council is
first a political body and only secondarily a legal one.” This is realpolitik at work.
If  one accepts this perspective, intervention decisions made by the UNSC may
seek to serve the interests o f  the P5 primarily before executing its mandate o f  ensuring
international peace and security secondarily. In terms o f  intervention decisions, Forsythe
(2012:842) explains that:
the most important members o f the Security Council usually approach the 
subjects o f  criminal law not primarily or uniquely with a long term and strategic 
view o f what should transpire for the common good in a lawful world order, but 
rather with strong consideration o f how they can adequately manage to protect 
their immediate subjective national interests given various pressures and power 
realities. As one scholar [John G. Stoessinger,] perceptively noticed some time 
ago, the major states “have tried to use the United Nations as a vehicle for the 
advancement o f their individual, antithetical foreign-policy interests.
Forsythe (Forsythe 2012:852) further illustrates the point in use o f  this example:
[ajfter the Prosecutor had secured arrest warrants for Sudanese President Omar 
Hassan al-Bashir and others, China received al-Bashir on an official visit in 2011, 
rather than arresting him. Other states, like Kenya, also hosted him rather than 
apprehending him and turning him over to ICC authorities. While there were 
more than thirty African states that were party to the Rome Statute, there was 
growing concern across Africa about the ICC. In some circles o f African opinion, 
people believed that the Prosecutor had not paid sufficient attention to African 
views regarding when arrest warrants were appropriate. Again, one can see that 
Chinese policy was affected by its many African contacts: while it was reluctant 
to exercise a veto in criminal law matters, it was not really committed to vigorous 
action by the ICC and its prosecutor. Especially when developing countries were 
not enthusiastic about ICC actions, China limited its cooperation as well.
26
This is not the only instance o f such realpolitik-influenced decision-making by members 
o f the P5. There are numerous examples detailed in the works o f these scholars and 
others.
The role o f realpolitik in P5 decision-making behavior is at the center o f  this 
work. Realpolitik appears to exert influence over individual state reaction to the 
criminality o f other states. Realpolitik also appears to impact intervention decisions by 
the P5. Totten (2013:219) sums the role o f realpolitik, state reaction, and the P5 in this 
manner:
many, if  not most, o f the P5’s votes regarding intervention in genocide in the past 
have been driven by realpolitik. In other words, the P5 have not been concerned 
primarily with the fate o f  the potential victims o f genocide but much more 
focused on whether intervening would be good for themselves or their allies. As 
the cliche goes, nation states do not have consciences. Concomitantly, the type o f 
mission— Chapter VI (peacekeeping) or Chapter VII (peace enforcement) o f  the 
Charter o f  the United Nations— is largely dictated by the P5 as well. Thus, instead 
of sending a robust mission in a timely fashion with a mandate that allows the 
mission’s troops to handle a job  properly, the P5 play politics and often approve 
missions that are sorely inadequate for the job. This is true for a whole host o f 
reasons, but the main point here is that the P5 virtually take on the God-like role 
o f deciding who will live and who will die.
It is here that this work situates itself, within the integrated theory o f state crime, by
analyzing state reaction to the state crime o f others, namely the genocide in Darfur. The




A holistic understanding o f complex events, such as crimes against humanity, 
genocide, or states’ responses to these crimes committed by other states, requires the 
application o f  theory and concepts from a variety o f  disciplines. This work utilizes the 
integrated theory o f  state crime to explain state criminality as well as issues associated 
with controlling such acts. In relation to the conflict in Darfur, the theory will be used to 
explain states’ reactions to the crimes o f  Sudan against Darfuri including the decision­
making at the UNSC. The use o f  the integrated theory to understand states’ reactions to 
the criminality o f others has never been fully outlined in previous research, especially in 
relation to the defining o f  such behaviors as crimes. Accordingly, a discussion o f  the 
integrated theory o f  state crime follows; the components o f organizational and 
international relations theories implicit in the theory will be drawn out more fully. A 
discussion is provided detailing why bringing these theoretical perspectives to a more 
central role in the integrated theory o f  state crime may provide additional answers to the 
processes o f  state control responses that are addressed in this work.
INTEGRATED THEORY OF STATE CRIME
For many decades, criminological theory has focused on offenses committed by 
those without great economic or social power (Barak 1990), with an inordinate emphasis 
on street crime (Rothe 2009b). An intellectual shift in the latter part o f the 20th century 
brought about novel ways o f  thinking and theorizing about crime, including research
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focused on the specific subsets o f the population that were under-researched in previous 
traditional criminological theories. This approach led to several new theories that were 
centered on populations or crimes that went further than much o f the traditional 
criminological theories. This period also brought theoretical integration with 
criminology and other fields to better understand phenomena. One o f these emerging 
multidisciplinary theories was the integrated theory o f state crime. It encompasses both 
traditional criminological theories and concepts from other disciplines to understand state 
crime. It has often been used with a focus on controls, or lack o f effective controls, that 
may lead to state criminality.
Theoretical frameworks utilized to analyze state crimes are varied. The most 
comprehensive theoretical frameworks combine existing criminological theories into a 
more integrated approach in an effort to holistically understand state crime. The first 
theoretical framework was proposed by Kramer and Michalowski in their (1990) 
integrated theory o f  state-corporate crime in which they discuss the criminal collusion 
between states and organizations. This theory was further elaborated upon by Kauzlarich 
and Kramer (1998:148), who identify “three catalysts for action[:]...(a) motivation or 
performance emphasis, (b) opportunity structure, and (c) the operationality o f  social 
control” (see also Kramer and Michalowski 2006). Motivations are the factors that make 
the commission o f  deviance an attractive option. Opportunities are created when 
deviance is permitted or may be executed under a specific set o f circumstances. Controls 
are mechanisms o f social control that prevent the deviance from occurring. Controls 
must fail if  deviance is to occur. Further, these catalysts are analyzed at three levels: 
institutional environment, organizational, and interactional (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998;
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Kramer and Michalowski 2006) which stem from existing criminological theories used to 
study organizational deviance (see also Kramer, Michalowski, and Kauzlarich 2002).
Kramer and M ichalowski’s (1990) state-corporate crime theory was later revised 
by Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) and further revised by Rothe (see Mullins and Rothe 
2008; Rothe and Mullins 2006; Rothe 2006; Rothe and Mullins 2011). Rothe’s (2006) 
integrated theory o f state crime follows in the footsteps o f  Kramer and M ichalowski’s 
(1990) original theory o f state-corporate crime by incorporating several types o f 
criminological theories, including disorganization, control, anomie, and deterrence, as 
well as organizational theories, into an integrated theory. Rothe (2006) departs from 
Kramer and Michalowski (1990) and Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) in two significant 
ways. First, she adds an additional catalyst: constraints. Constraints are roadblocks or 
obstacles to deviance that must be circumnavigated for the acts to occur. Second, Rothe 
(2006) continues to utilize the original levels o f  analysis (macro/structural, 
meso/organizational, and micro levels), but also adds a fourth, the international level, to 
obtain a holistic understanding o f  the acts and the intricate nature o f  such crimes. In the 
integrated theory o f state crime, the international is separate and distinct from the macro 
because the factors working at the macro domestic and macro international levels may be 
very different and impact the commission o f deviance in very different manners (see 
Figure 2 for a full detail o f  the theoretical ideologies interwoven into the integrated 
theory o f state crime). The integrated theory o f state crime has been used often by 
critical criminologists to explain state deviance and criminality (e.g., Mullins 2009; Rothe 
and Mullins 2006; Rothe 2009a)
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This work seeks to clarify a specific component o f  the integrated theory o f state 
crime by explicating the variable o f realpolitik. 1 propose that the variable realpolitik be 
added to the model as a motivation. Rothe (2009b) already includes the concept under 
the terminology “political, economic, ideological interests/resources” in motivations. 
Remember that realpolitik is based on three theoretical components: military, political, 
and economic interests that states seek to protect above all else. By clarifying that these 
are actually realpolitik, we may bridge the criminological and international relations 
bodies o f literature for a deeper understanding o f these complex international 
mechanisms in action.
It is not only the theoretical component noted above that is central to this work. 
The dotted boxes in Figure 2 indicate the specific parts o f the theory that are applicable. 
Rothe’s (2009b) theory is strong on integration o f criminology and other disciplines, 
which is required to study a phenomenon as complex as this work attempts. The 
following sections will draw out the theories implicit in the integrated theory o f  state 
crime that are relevant in explaining intervention decision-making by the P5.
Diffusion o f  Responsibility
This component draws from organizational theories and is applied in the integrated 
theory o f  state crime at the organizational level (Rothe 2009b). Organizational theories 
have been used in the study o f white-collar crime to explain that the organization, itself, 
may actually promote criminality (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998). This body o f  theories 
has also drawn upon criminological theories to understand organization behavior, 
specifically anomie (Merton 1949). Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998:145) explain that:
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Figure 2. Rothe’s (2009b: 112) Integrated Theory o f State Crim e’s Causal Logic Model 
with Integrated Theory Variables.
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[organizations...are extremely goal oriented and concerned with performance, 
while norms governing the mean to achieve these goals may be weak or absent. 
Thus, legitimate means to achieve goals may be unavailable or blocked in some 
way. The emphasis on goal attainment, combined with blocked legitimate means, 
may induce “strain” and compel organizations to “innovate” and use illegitimate 
means to achieve their goals.
In this way, organizations may seek to fill operational goals in ways that may include
criminality in order to achieve success.
One factor that permits the use o f  illegitimate means by organizations is the
diffusion o f  responsibility. Feldman and Rosen (1978) define the term in this way:
[bjasically, group members share in the culpability for the negative outcomes o f 
the group's actions, whereas persons acting alone have sole responsibility for the 
negative outcomes o f  their actions. Hence, the single individual, acting by • 
himself, feels a greater degree o f individual responsibility than do the group 
members.
This is applicable to the work at hand because all o f  the decision-making in this dataset 
occurred in groups. The group dynamic o f the United Nations and the UNSC may permit 
members to vote in ways that may seem acceptable when executed in a group situation 
but may not be as morally or socially acceptable if  similar decisions were made without 
the group dynamic. This diffusion o f  responsibility, where the level o f responsibility in a 
group dynamic is less than the level o f  responsibility for sole decision-making, is o f 
critical importance to this work. Although individual decisions are published and 
member states may be held responsible for those individual voting decisions, the decision 
to intervene or in what manners to intervene are decided by overall group votes. This 
may permit voters to feel less responsible for actions taken by the group or mitigate their 
own self-interests based on the group dynamic.
Definition o f  the Situation
The definition o f the situation variable in Rothe’s (2009b) model is also at the
center o f this work. Perinbanayagam (1974:523) explains:
there are two dimensions to human conduct— one a series o f responses to 
objective situations and another to a series o f responses to meanings. Such a 
distinction between objects and meanings is an untenable and indefensible one in 
terms o f  human conduct.
Thus, the definition o f  the situation includes not only the literal facts o f the situation but
the manner in which individuals interpret a situation. Perinbanayagam (1974) writes in
terms o f  individuals, but this idea may be extrapolated into group dynamics as well. In a
group, individuals gather and define the situation based on literal facts and a compilation
of individual interpretations, resulting in a collective definition o f the situation. The key
here is the gap between reality and perception o f the situation (Perinbanayagam 1974)
and the manner in which both individuals and groups join the two to ultimately define it.
This project focuses on the definition o f the situation and how that label dictates
the interventions available. This theoretical component will be relied upon heavily in the
analysis. The objective definition o f the situation as opposed to the perception o f it is
critical to understanding the labeling o f  the conflict in Darfur. Realpolitik is
hypothesized to impact the subjective definitional process at the international level, and
in the case o f Darfur particularly.
Strain
Strain is the result o f desiring goals that one does not have the means to achieve 
(Agnew 1987; Merton 1949; Messner and Rosenfeld 2001). It was originally theorized 
by Robert Merton (1949) who described strain as resulting from the inordinate focus on
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financial accumulation and visible signs o f success in US culture that leaves many 
Americans desiring the trappings o f success but lacking the mechanisms in which to 
obtain such items legitimately. Deviance may result when individuals utilize other means 
to achieve desires, including criminal behavior. Merton (1949) applied these ideas at the 
individual level, where he identified four types o f  adaptations to strain, as well as at the 
societal, macro-level to explain rates o f criminality in the US. When discussing strain at 
the macro-level, he identified social structure as a major component o f  strain, which may 
be seen in the vast disparities between socioeconomic statuses that still exists in US 
society to date.
Merton’s (1949) strain theory was later adapted into general strain theory by 
Robert Agnew (1987; 1992), but Agnew ignored the social structure. Ignoring the social 
structure removes much o f the explanatory power o f  strain at the international level. 
Although Merton (1949) focused on the United States and the desire for capital 
accumulation that has led to social structural imbalances that cause strain, his theory may 
be applied at the international level as well. There are many instances in which a state 
may have desires that may be unobtainable through legitimate means and deviance may 
result. The goals/desires/wants versus means problem for states may be simply a 
problem o f competing interests. An understanding o f  these competing interests is crucial.
International Relations Theory
Rothe (2009b) includes international relations theories implicitly in her model and 
I seek to draw this out. The two international relations theories that are applicable here 
are realism/neorealism and realpolitik. Each will be reviewed in turn.
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Realism and Neorealism. The central concept o f  the realism school, now known 
as the neorealism school, is “motivation by pragmatic self-interest” (Hutchings 1999:15). 
The realism school is often traced to Thucydides and his writings o f the Peloponnesian 
War in the early 400s B.C. (Wayman and Diehl 1994). It is Machiavelli, however, who 
is cited as one o f the earliest and most prominent realist scholars. He wrote o f  the social 
contract obligor and state ruler as a “prince” (Machiavelli [1532] 1979). Yet, this prince 
is no benevolent figure; he is “a great hypocrite and a liar” (Machiavelli [1532]
1979:134) who should make every effort to be a good steward but “should know how to 
enter into evil when necessity commands” (Machiavelli [1532] 1979:135). Machiavelli 
([1532] 1979) explains that a prince should maintain appearances o f  proper and just 
behavior but execute his duties as he personally sees fit. The prince should seek to make 
his kingdom fear rather than hate him, and do whatever necessary to maintain the 
kingdom and its sovereignty. A lack o f  morality and deceit are hallmarks o f  the prince he 
describes, one who does whatever necessary to obtain goals and prosperity.
This lack o f  accountability on the part o f  those in power is important because 
realism insists that foreign policy is guided by a desire for greater wealth accumulation 
and power rather than moral interests (Bjola 2009) and rests on the state sovereignty 
established in the Treaty o f Westphalia (1648). Further, the entanglement o f morality 
into foreign policy only makes such decisions complex and ambiguous (Bjola 2009). 
Realist scholars proscribe to a moral relativism in which morality is pertinent in some, 
but certainly not all, aspects o f  governance (Bjola 2009). Legitimacy and morality are 
mutually exclusive. Morgenthau (Bjola 2009; Yunus 2003), however, theorizes a moral 
component in foreign relations in a survival-of-the-fittest typology (see also Kissinger
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1977); morality has a place in foreign relations when it is used to ensure continued
existence o f the state (Bjola 2009). After all. “ [mjorality without security is ineffectual;
security without morality is empty. To establish the relationship and proportion between
these goals is perhaps the most profound challenge before our government and our
nation” (Kissinger 1977:66).
Hobbes, alternately, specifically denounces the idea o f  security in the
international arena. Rather, the Hobbesian theory o f  international relations centers
around his definition o f  the state o f nature as one o f  constant turmoil (W illiams 2006) or
“bellum omnium contra onmes...lhe state o f nature = international relations = the war o f
all against all” (Wight 2005:144-5). Due to this unending threat, states must remain in a
constant readiness to prepare against attack, and self-defense must be a top priority for
any state (Bjola 2009). In fact:
[the Hobbesian] state o f  nature derives from precisely the lack o f  any such 
com monality...individuals construct their own realities, their own understanding 
o f  what is good and bad, desirable and undesirable, threatening and unthreatening, 
and act on the basis on these beliefs. Lacking agreement on what the world is, as 
well as over what it ought to be, the state o f nature is anarchic in a sense far 
deeper than that captured by...rationalist thinkers... The state o f  nature is defined 
not just by a lack o f trust, but much more fundamentally by a condition o f 
epistemological indeterminacy which renders even the universal fear o f  death at 
best a partial remedy, and the existence o f conflict and mistrust endemic 
(emphasis in original). (W illiams 2006:256-7)
This mistrust may be evidenced in the military build-up o f states, especially in
industrialized nations. The proliferation o f nuclear arms is an example o f  the constant
state o f  readiness required for self-protection o f  states, as is the possession but secrecy
surrounding the type or numbers o f such weapons. Hobbes makes clear that states cannot
and should not trust each other because the individualized interests possessed by each
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state make true allies difficult to find; states must be prepared to defend against friend or 
foe at any time.
Lack o f trust between states at the international level has existed since states 
began forming. Hutchings (1999:16) explains that this is consistent with realism as “the 
forces o f ought and is push and pull against each other in a perpetual tug o f war, but they 
do not combine, either in terms o f synthesis or in terms o f one subsuming the other.” 
Further:
[mjodem political realism takes on board two o f Hobbes’s [sic] most important 
argum ents.. .the notion o f  order as a central political value which is the effective 
presupposition o f  right... [and] the idea o f a strict distinction between state and 
inter-state politics in general...the norms governing politics in general (domestic 
and international) tend to be derived from the fundamental interest in security. 
(Hutchings 1999:19)
International political realism differentiates between the ideologies o f right versus might; 
states may see certain behaviors or interventions as the right or moral course o f  action. 
However, states may refuse to commit to such because they may be inconsistent with the 
opposing, but equally strong, desire for protection o f  self-interest and security at all costs. 
It is this duality o f roles that ushered in the neorealist school o f  thought.
The neorealist school o f  politics places domestic and international politics into 
separate spheres (Hutchings 1999). Kenneth Waltz, the most prominent neorealist, 
explains “[t]he conception o f the international is, in line with political realism, one which 
stresses the international as being fundamentally anarchic, lacking a principle o f order” 
(Hutchings 1999:20). Neorealism may be summarized in this manner: “ [internationally, 
states operate in a context o f anarchy which dictates certain kinds o f  priorities and 
behaviors and a single conception o f the good for all states, that is, to ensure international 
order and a relative advantage within it” (Hutchings 1999:20). It is clear that the realist
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and neorealist schools are related but differ in that the neorealist school moves away from 
the duality o f  right versus might. The focus o f  the neorealist school is state-centered 
individualized interests in relation to international politics, which is often described as 
realpolitik.
Realpolitik. Realpolitik was coined by August Ludwig von Rochau’s (1972
[1853]) Grundsatze der Realpolitik, Angewendet a u f die Staatlichen Zustande
Deutschlands (Principles o f  Realpolitik, Applied to the State Circumstances in Germany)
and is simply defined as a state’s own self-interest: “nation-states pursue their own
national interests and conceive these national interests primarily in terms o f  power”
(Wayman and Diehl 1994:5). The concept is generally considered to involve three
components: political interests, military interests, and economic interests (Bassiouni
2008; Rothe 2010; Wayman and Diehl 1994). Realpolitik plays a major role in foreign
policymaking. Yunus (2003:166) explains the idea well:
Morgenthau gives his vision o f  world politics as, ‘all nations, our own included, 
as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms o f 
pow er... we are (then) able to judge other nations as we judge our own and, 
having judged them in this fashion, we are then capable o f pursuing policies that 
respect the interest o f other nations, while protecting and promoting those o f  our 
own. Moderation in policy cannot fail to reflect the moderation o f  political 
judgment.
The central issue here is that the state’s own interests come before those o f  others. 
Gumplowicz (as cited in Aho 1975:49) explains, “the social structure is no longer 
founded upon blood relations but upon domination relations.” Gumplowicz wrote o f the 
blood relations o f kinship, but this may also be extrapolated to the blood relations and 
interconnectedness o f humankind in today’s global village. His statement still rings true
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in this fresh definitional application, as imperialism and realpolitik may be perceived as
superseding the protection o f  basic human rights.
Cohen (1975) explains realpolitik as a cost versus benefit analysis where power is
the central goal and the security o f a nation is a direct result o f  the amount o f power held.
He describes realpolitik’s propositions as follows:
[t]he security o f a state will be most readily enhanced if  it follows policies which 
will ultimately result in increases in its own power or decreases or at least no 
increases in its opponent’s power ...pow er is o f  the essence... states must 
constantly seek to increase their power relative to actual or potential 
opponents.. .the policies o f  a state, which are the ways in which the power o f a 
state is exercised, must be properly designed to gain the desired goals...[and] a 
proper policy will maximize gains o f  power and security while minimizing costs 
and risks. (Cohen 1975:172).
Further, he states emphatically that, “ [o]nly by the practice o f  realpolitik can a state
become secure or remain secure” (Cohen 1975:173). Also, states employing realpolitik
“are skeptical o f  international law, o f  the United Nations, and o f  any ideals... that attempt
to transcend or replace nationalism” (Wayman and Diehl 1994:5). In these terms, state
power and security transcend all else.
Wayman and Diehl (1994) add the concept o f  strategy to their realpolitik
definition. Because “security is a function o f power and power is a function o f  military
capabilities” (Kegley and Raymond 1994:187), realpolitik may be considered on a
continuum ranging from the most strategic to the least strategic decisions in relation to
national interests (Kegley and Raymond 1994). Further, Kegley and Raymond
(1994:207) classify humanitarian intervention as the “ least strategic” o f all state
decisions. For the current work, however, realpolitik must be analyzed from a
criminological perspective.
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In sum, it is the integration o f criminological, organizational, and international 
relations theories that provide the strongest theoretical foundation in which to frame this 
study. This is done through the use o f the integrated theory o f state crime. Because these 
research questions are geared toward a comprehensive understanding o f a complex topic, 
a qualitative analysis is the most appropriate method. It will provide the reader with a 
holistic and detailed understanding o f  how and why realpolitik may or may not influence 





An integrated methodological approach will be employed, including a conflict 
narrative and a qualitative analysis. A brief description o f the conflict in Darfur will be 
provided. Then, a case study will detail a timeline and description o f interventions 
applied to the conflict in Darfur by the UN and its member bodies. A qualitative analysis 
will follow seeking to understand why such interventions were selected, as well as if 
realpolitik may have played a role in UN and UNSC intervention decisions. The 
intervention case study and the analysis will center on the UN and UNSC decisions.
In an effort to explain this decision-making process by the P5, the qualitative case 
study method will be used. This work seeks to determine if  the P5 individually and 
collectively as the UNSC circumvented forceful intervention as authorized and mandated 
by the Genocide Convention and, if  so, what justifications were used to do such. These 
questions are a perfect match to a qualitative case study approach because, as Yin 
(2003:13) explains, “ [a] case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” Case studies are heuristic 
(Merriam 1988), inductive (Greene 2007; Merriam 1988; Stake 2000; Yin 2003), holistic 
(Merriam 1988; Stake 2000), and permit the emergence o f  new or unknown variables or 
interactions (Merriam 1988). It is this ability to let the previously unknown emerge that 
makes the case study the most appropriate method for this work.
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To date, the conflict in Darfur has not been studied in a manner that allows the 
themes related to avoidance o f effective interventions to emerge and permit an 
understanding o f both how and why thus-far inadequate interventions have been chosen. 
Many have undertaken the study o f the factors related to the violence and the causation; 
however, taking a different approach and focusing on the decision-making process o f  the 
UNSC’s Permanent Five individually and collectively will allow for a more holistic and 
complete understanding o f  the conflict response.
A case study o f  the interventions applied aims to bring to light the associated 
political processes involved in such decisions at both the P5 state and international levels. 
From domestic documents detailing P5 discussions, hearings, and investigations related 
to Darfur, as well as UNSC hearings and resolutions, the analysis will focus on the actual 
text, along with the associated contextual and latent meanings o f the words used and 
labels applied to the conflict throughout these documents. By placing the labels and 
discussions related to the conflict in context with the intervention decisions, I seek to 
deconstruct the discourse related to the conflict. I aim to contextualize the social, 
political, economic, and militaristic influences on the conflict terminology and resultant 
intervention decisions by the P5 and UNSC. Through application o f the integrated theory 
o f state crime, 1 seek to determine the possible influence o f realpolitik in this decision­
making process.
Analysis o f  this discourse will begin with triangulation o f the obtained data 
through multiple sources to ensure validity. Next, the data will be arranged 
chronologically to permit a thorough understanding o f  the documentation, discussions,
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and reports from the origination o f  the conflict and the initial mention o f Darfur 
discussions and UNSC meetings from 2002 to the mid-2012.
Once arranged chronologically, each document will be read individually for 
themes related to the discourse o f  the conflict. Because the case study method will be 
used, unexpected patterns and themes may emerge. The analysis will be sensitive to 
such. The variable under study is realpolitik and its potential influence on use o f  force 
decisions permitted in cases o f  genocide in accordance with the Genocide Convention. 
Data will be analyzed for discourse related to decision-making behavior o f  the P5 
individually and collectively as the UNSC.
DATA
The primary and secondary data used in this work will come from a variety o f 
sources. The primary data are derived from two sources: (1) domestic reports generated 
by the five states holding permanent seats on the UNSC, including investigations into the 
situation in Darfur, hearings, and statements, and (2) intergovernmental reports generated 
by the United Nations and its Security Council, including mission reports, UNSC 
presidential documents, UNSC meeting documents, UNSC resolutions, and UN 
Secretary-General documents, statements, and press releases related to Darfur. Domestic 
investigations and reports compiled by the United States will be obtained through the 
Congressional and White House official websites. Chinese reports will be gathered from 
the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs website. French documents are available through the 
websites o f its Senate and National Assembly. The Russian Federation (RF) also 
provides access to public documents on the website o f its Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs.
44
Reports from the United Kingdom o f Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) are 
available on the website o f  their Parliament. United Nations documentation will be 
obtained from the public domain official website and archives o f the United Nations and 
its Library o f Documents. The conflict in Darfur was a much-discussed topic by the 
United Nations, as evidenced by the total o f 3,939 documents referencing the issue 
between January 1, 2002 and June 30, 2012.
The United Nations offers a tremendous amount o f  documentation o f  meetings 
and actions on its website. The United Nations Bibliographic Information System 
(UNBISNET) houses documents related to voting, speeches, and bibliographic data. The 
United Nation Official Document System (UNODS) is a more general documentation 
service which “covers all types o f  official United Nations documentation, beginning in 
1993... including access to the resolutions o f the General Assembly, Security Council, 
Economic and Social Council, and Trusteeship Council from 1946 onwards” (United 
Nations 2012b). Finally, UN press releases are housed in a separate database.
An Internet search o f the UNODS found approximately 31,800 documents with 
the words “Sudan” or “Darfur” within them from 2002 to 2012. When only those 
documents in English were specified, approximately 15,879 documents dated between 
January 1, 2002, and June 30, 2012. Many o f the mentions o f the word “Sudan” without 
“Darfur” were in relation to the hostilities and subsequent secession o f South Sudan as 
well as other matters pertinent to the state o f  Sudan but not directly related to the conflict 
occurring in Darfur. Because this work focuses solely on the conflict in Darfur, the 
documents with “Sudan” but not “Darfur” in them were eliminated from the analysis. 
When searching for only “Darfur” in the documents, 3,588 documents were returned
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from UNODS. The press release database yielded 281 documents. UBNISNET held 20 
voting records, 299 speech records, and 1,032 bibliographic documents. Therefore the 
total number o f documents from the UN document services totaled 5,220. After 
combining the documents into a single list, many duplicates were identified. Once 
removed, 3,939 documents containing the word “Darfur” were identified.
Each document was read to determine content. Some o f  the documents discuss 
Darfur in terms o f water quality or other peripheral issues unrelated to the conflict or the 
interventions applied by the United Nations. Many o f these documents were various UN 
member state representatives speaking o f  concerns about the conflict but had no direct 
relation. These documents were also removed from the analysis. Once the non-relevant 
documents were removed, a total o f 2,380 documents referencing Darfur remained. O f 
those 2,380 documents related to the conflict in Darfur, only 390 contained discussions o f 
the conflict relevant to this work. Along with these primary sources, secondary data will 
also be used.
Secondary data was used to triangulate information obtained in primary sources, 
as well as to provide context to the primary source data. Secondary data was drawn from 
multiple sources, including reports and press releases issued by intergovernmental 
organizations such the African Union and the European Union, as well as 
nongovernmental organizations such as the International Committee o f  the Red Cross, 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. These reports and documents were 
accessed through the public domain websites o f each organization. Books written on the 
conflict were also used (e.g., Cockett 2010; Flint and de Waal 2008; Jok 2007; Prunier 
2005). There were also hundreds o f  reports related to Darfur available from newspaper
46
and other media outlets. Secondary data was verified by triangulating primary data with 
at least two secondary sources to ensure the validity o f the data obtained.
LIMITATIONS
A major and commonly cited limitation o f the case study method is a lack o f 
generalizability that may exist due to the use o f  a single case (Merriam 1988; Stake 
2000). Other problems involved in case study research may involve reliability and 
validity (Merriam 1988). These issues rest on the ability to replicate findings, or lack 
thereof, due to use o f a single case, as well as each researcher’s ability to execute the 
study without bias. After all, each individual harbors biases, conscious or unconscious, 
that impact research, from the choosing o f  an area o f  research to the approach taken to 
undertake such and the variables chosen for the analysis. These limitations may be 
mitigated in the use o f  triangulation o f multiple sources to validate data obtained 
(Merriam 1988; Silverman 2005; Stake 2000; Yin 2003).
There are other limitations to this work due to the nature o f the phenomenon 
under study. One o f the most glaring limitations is the availability o f data. Research o f  a 
highly politicized and sensitive topic involves some insurmountable issues, such as 
confidential meetings, confidential or unreleased documents, undocumented meetings 
held behind closed doors, redacted documentation, and classification o f documents that 
prevents release to the public. The United States government, as well as the governments 
o f  the other four permanent members o f the UNSC, uses discretion in permitting access 
or publication o f documents, hearings, and decisions regarding relations with other 
countries. The largest obstacle in this research is the inability to obtain all o f the
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documents that pertain to the decision-making process o f member states o f the UNSC in 
regards to the labeling o f  and response to the events in Darfur. The only way in which to 
mitigate this limitation is to obtain every relevant document available to create the most 
complete depiction possible o f the actual discussions and meetings related to Darfur.
Another issue is accessibility to data. The data released by states in relation to 
discussions or decisions related to other countries, may be biased or politically sanitized. 
As detailed above, states will not create documents for all meetings in relation to other 
countries, and may not release documents that are created. Therefore, researchers must 
question the validity and integrity o f the available documents. The documents and data 
that are available may not elicit a full and unbiased understanding o f  the situation, as 
states may find it in their own interest to remain politically correct. When the released 
documents are analyzed, they must be done so with the understanding that the documents 




Although this work focuses on the labeling and discourse applied to the Darfuri 
conflict by international institutions o f social control, understanding the conflict is 
important to such an analysis. At its roots, I suggest that the conflict is politically based. 
Moreover, these political differences were socially constructed to exacerbate divisiveness 
where little had existed historically.
SUDAN
Today, Sudan is home to “Africa’s longest running civil war” (Cockett 2010:159).
It lies directly west o f the Horn o f Africa and is a large and vibrant country o f
approximately 40 million citizens (e.g., Cockett 2010; Flint and de Waal 2008; Jok 2007;
Prunier 2005). Sudan was colonized by the British in 1899 and it is here that the
dangerous division between the regions o f Sudan as a political construct began. Cockett
(2010:31) details that:
[t]he British were, essentially, only interested in the riverain centre. The two 
other parts o f what they handed on as ‘Sudan’ [at Sudanese independence] in 
1956 were only late additions. Darfur, as big as France, home to the non- 
Arabized, Muslim tribes such as the Zaghawa and Fur, was only vaguely joined to 
the lands ruled from Khartoum when the British conquered it in 1916. South 
Sudan, formerly known as Equatoria, entirely different in every conceivable way, 
geographically, religiously and ethnically, was admitted as an almost completely 
separate country by the British and only grafted onto ‘Sudan’ a few years before 
the end o f  colonial rule.
Colonialism is at the root o f some o f problems that will later erupt into violence in Sudan.
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The Darfur area o f  Sudan has been traditionally home to many tribes. Dar means 
“tribal homeland" (Cockett 2010) or “country” (Prunier 2005) in Arabic, so Darfur 
translates as homeland or country o f  the Fur, one o f  the major tribes living in the area. 
Others include the Masalit and the Zaghawa. The areas inhabited by the tribes are 
identified as Dar Masalit or Dar Zaghawa-, however, the entire western region o f the 
Sudan has come to be called Darfur despite the fact that the region is home to many more 
than the Fur. Thus, when discussing the region o f Darfur, it is important to remember 
that the term is not used in the strictest sense (Dar Fur) but, rather, references the 
westernmost region o f  Sudan that has come to be collectively identified as such and 
encompasses three states: North Darfur, South Darfur, and Western Darfur.
This amalgamation o f regions under a single state is a one major reason 
underlying both the secession o f South Sudan (now the independent Republic o f South 
Sudan as o f July 2011) and the twenty-plus years o f conflict in Darfur. However, this 
was not the only social structural concern remaining when Sudan finally gained 
independence in 1956. A second British remnant is also a major factor in both conflicts: 
the focus on Khartoum, capital o f Sudan, at the expense o f the other regions.
When colonized by the British, Sudan continued to run under a tribal 
administration system similar to the way in which it had been functioning (Mullins and 
Rothe 2008:168). The British did not seek to make major changes in the way that the 
government ran other than to begin to accumulate resources in the capital o f Khartoum. 
This concentration o f economic, political, educational, health care, and other resources 
left the remainder o f the country suffering from deprivation and neglect (Mullins and 
Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005). In fact, more than half o f all state “income and assets”
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(Prunier 2005:25) remained in and around Khartoum (Cockett 2010:30). Very few
resources eventually made it to Darfur (Mullins and Rothe 2008). Khartoum has
historically been, and continues to be, the center o f  cultural and economic life o f the
country. Cockett (2010:19) explains:
[t]his paradox o f  Khartoum, o f a core o f  wealth and optimism surrounded by rings 
o f  extreme poverty, injustice and political exclusion, is also the paradox o f 
Sudan...its post-independence story...can seem like nothing more than a long 
series o f  armed struggles between the centre o f  the country and the peripheries -  
Darfur, the south and east -  as people fight to claim what they feel is theirs from a 
self-absorbed ruling elite in Khartoum.
Additionally, the oil that undergirds much o f Sudan’s economy comes from regions near
the center o f  the country but is pumped north towards Khartoum, where the profits stay
(Cockett 2010). Sudan’s economy is heavily reliant on this oil production, with over half
o f government revenues and almost 95% o f exports stemming from the resource (Cockett
2010). Meanwhile, the men and women who live above the oil reserves gain no benefit
from the resources right below their feet (Cockett 2010). This is but one example o f  the
focus on Khartoum at the expense o f  other regions o f  the country. Prunier (2005) calls
this “benign neglect,” while Cockett (2010:32) explains that the British “purposefully
underdeveloped Darfur in order to keep it under control.”
Drought, Desertification, and Famine
Another major contributing factor to the violence is the extreme environmental 
conditions that have plagued Sudan, and specifically Darfur, over the past few decades 
(Cockett 2010; Mullins and Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005). There were a series o f  droughts 
and associated famine throughout the 1980s (Cockett 2010; Mullins and Rothe 2008), 
which led to the death, and displacement o f  hundreds o f  thousands (Cockett 2010;
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Mullins and Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005); almost 100,000 Darfuri had starved to death by
the mid-1980s (Cockett 2010). Darfuri interviewed by Cockett (2010) discussed at least
seventeen droughts between the 1970s and 2004, with the most severe in 1984-1985,
1991, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004.
The changing environmental conditions are very important as they led tribes to
alter their means o f  survival to combat the degradation.
The Arab pastoralists normally moved from south to north to follow the rain, but 
from 1990 onwards, because o f the lack o f  rainfall and the subsequent shortage o f 
grass, they would cut short the time they spent in the north from seven months to 
ju st two or three. Instead, they started encroaching on the more fertile areas in the 
centre and south o f Darfur, particularly around the Jebel Marra, the mountainous 
heart o f Darfur... This area was mainly populated by the African Fur, Masalit and 
other tribes. Thus, the Arab nomads began attacking the settled farmers to claim a 
share o f the available water and grazing land. (Cockett 2010:172)
These encroachments had typically been handled locally and the groups successfully
resolved such conflicts in that manner for decades. However, as the political climate o f
Sudan began to emphasize the differences in the tribes, such conflicts became more
difficult to resolve locally through longstanding traditional tribal mechanisms (Cockett
2010). Additionally, Mullins and Rothe (2008:170) warn that, “[t]he focus on
desertification assumes that this is a natural and uncontrollable process.” Although the
environment played a major role, the conflict cannot be explained simply in terms o f
environmental degradation and changing sustainability patterns o f  tribes. These factors
were cumulative to the use o f ethnic labels and divisive political rhetoric, as well as the
heightened attention to such.
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DIVISIVE POLITICAL DISCOURSE
Although the tribes living in Darfuri states had coexisted peacefully for centuries, 
with traditional ways o f resolving conflicts, much o f the literature on the conflict focuses 
on the more recent history o f  the tribes pitted against one another. It is vital to note that 
these tribes did not readily identify themselves as Arab or African, nor were these labels 
needed or important (Mullins and Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005). They simply lived their 
lives as they had for centuries and had little conflict amongst the groups.
This changed when politicians began to construct distrust and fear between the 
groups in order to further their own political desires (Mullins and Rothe 2008; Prunier 
2005). One point at which this is readily seen is when the Constitutional Committee was 
formed in 1965, where politicians proposed three different ideologies. South Sudan 
desired a constitution based on secular ideology, the Islamic Charter Front pushed for a 
fully Islamic constitution, and the Unionists wanted a constitution based in Islam 
(Mullins and Rothe 2008). It is here that the first “Arab” versus “African” split began to 
form, whereby Arabs were socially constructed as the “ruling elite” (Mullins and Rothe 
2008:170)— consistent with the majority Arab Khartoum that remained at the center o f 
politics and modernization in Sudan.
A few years later, this “Arab ruling elite” would gain greater momentum. The 
tribes o f Darfur were traditionally Madhist and their political party was the Umma 
(Cockett 2010; Mullins and Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005). The Umma never gained 
political power in Sudan, leaving Darfur further politically neglected and unrepresented 
(Cockett 2010; Mullins and Rothe 2008). In the late 1960s, a split in the Umma party left 
two major political players: Sadiq al-Mahdi and his uncle Imam al-Hadi (Mullins and
Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005). While campaigning during the 1968 election. al-Madhi 
sought support from the “African” tribes while al-Hadi courted the “Arabs” (Mullins and 
Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005). This split was exacerbated by the accompanying political 
rhetoric, which built upon the Khartoum-centric frustrations o f the African tribes and 
made it appear that the Arabs themselves were the root o f the problem (Mullins and 
Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005). The “Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa eagerly accepted this belief, 
given that historically their presence and representation was absent from the power center 
o f Khartoum” (Mullins and Rothe 2008:170). This political ideology brought decades o f 
resource deprivation and neglect frustrations to the surface and gave it a face: an Arab 
face.
Soon after this political chasm began to form, Libya’s Ghadaffi attempted to take 
Darfur as part o f Libya in the 1970s. This invasion further intensified the precarious 
“Arab nomadic tribes” versus “Fur settled farmers” divide in Darfur, as well as filled the 
area with arms (Cockett 2010:46). In fact, leaders o f the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM) labeled Ghadaffi’s plan as the “Arabization” or “Islamization” o f Darfur (Cockett 
2010). “It was this Arabization o f the struggle... that brought the taint o f racism and 
ethnic cleansing that would shape the conflict from the late 1990s onwards, leading many 
to characterize it later as ‘genocide’” (Cockett 2010:175). Further, Prunier (2005:46) 
describes that the:
rough handling o f  Darfur by the Libyans, the Chadians, and Khartoum forces 
decisively worsened the regional ethno-political landscape. Tribes that had seen 
themselves primarily in local terms were suddenly catapulted into a broader 
artificial world where they were summoned to declare themselves as either 
“Arab” or zurga. The “Arabs” were “progressive” or “revolutionary”, while the 
“Africans” were “anti-Arab” and “reactionary” .
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The political split between Arabs and Africans, where none had existed before, is what 
many journalists have identified as the root o f the conflict. This is how the conflict was 
labeled an ethnic conflict while neglecting all other contributing factors such as resource 
deprivation and desertification as discussed above. This complex conflict cannot be 
reduced to such simple explanations. In fact, Cockett (2010:174) explains that the 
leaders o f the rebels groups in Darfur told him it was “primarily a political war.”
REBEL GROUPS STRIKE
When the Darfuri frustrations reached a boiling point, several groups formed to 
address the inequality in the social structure, or to simply strike back at their oppressors. 
The two major rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan 
Liberation Army (SLA), are most often linked to these causes. The JEM is a Zaghawa 
rebel group (Prunier 2005), who published a “Black Book” in 2002 circulated in 
Khartoum, listing many o f the problems that the Darfuri had with the government and 
Khartoum (Cockett 2010). This became the manifesto o f the movement. The JEM 
wasn’t focused on Darfur solely, but, rather, desired larger social change that would 
enable more social equality (Cockett 2010). Alternately, the Sudan Liberation Army 
(SLA) was focused on Darfur and sought more political equality and representation in 
Khartoum (Cockett 2010). The JEM had a larger, macro-level list o f  concerns whereby 
the SLA simply wanted more for Darfur, which their demands narrowly focused upon 
(Cockett 2010).
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Both groups were implicated in the attack identified as the impetus to the increase 
in violence that led the Government o f Sudan (GoS) to arm militias to address the rebel 
groups.
[0 ]n  26 February a group o f about 300 men supported by thirty “technicals” 
attacked the small town o f Golu, killing nearly 200 soldiers...word “insurrection” 
used for first tim e.. .Darfur was not simply armed looting or an action o f road- 
cutter, as the government alleged...a certain “acceptable” level o f violence in the 
Western province had been routine, and nobody was very worried by “normal” 
killings. But 300 men and their technical— this was a level o f  organization which 
was new. (Prunier 2005:93)
After the attack, the GoS gave the perpetrators ten days to surrender, promising a military
solution within 24 hours if  surrender did not occur (Prunier 2005). Once that deadline
had passed, the low-intensity violence that had occurred in Darfur for years intensified
greatly (Prunier 2005). In Darfur, violence had always been followed by negotiations o f
peace, which was always later followed by more violence leading to further peace
negotiations. This vicious circle continued for decades until this attack in February 2003,
which became the point o f no return in the conflict (Mullins and Rothe 2008).
JANJAW EED
The Janjaweed is a militia group that has existed in Sudan since the 1980s 
(Mullins and Rothe 2008). Janjaweed  comes from the Arabic jinn  meaning “spirit” and 
ja w a d  meaning “horse” and may be “roughly translated into ‘ghostly riders’ or ‘evil 
horsemen’” (Prunier 2005:xv). The vast majority o f the literature on the conflict in 
Darfur, however, commonly defines the word as translating into “devil on horseback.” 
Despite these definitional variations, all agree that this Arab militia rides in on horses and 
maims, burns, rapes, and kills the things and people in its path.
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The Janjaweed are a vital part o f the conflict narrative because they have been
funded, armed, and supported by the GoS (Cockett 2010; de Waal 2007; Mullins and
Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005). “[T]hese rough armed bands had existed since the late 1980s
in an undeterminate [sic] zone half-way between being bandits and government thugs”
(Prunier 2005:97). However, they were promoted to government henchmen when
President al-Bashir’s Special Task Force on Darfur solidified the relationship between the
government and the Janjaweed. This relationship is evidenced by the Sudanese military
uniforms, including rank emblems, provided to the Janjaweed (Cockett 2010; Flint and de
Waal 2008; Mullins and Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005). The Government o f Sudan denied
such an alliance but the evidence was undeniable.
In Sudan, “the word “Janjaw eed ’ first appeared in September o f [2003] when the
attack on the small town o f Jebel Marra was reported” (Prunier 2005). Around the same
time, Dr. Mukesh Kapila, UN Chief in Sudan, met with a member o f  al-Bashir’s
administration in September 2003, where he was told that the President wanted “a final
solution in Darfur” (Cockett 2010:170). Prunier (2005:100) describes the brutal tactics
utilized by these government-sanctioned killers:
[a]fter the Antonov’s [Russian planes] had finished their grisly job  [dropping 
crude bombs], combat helicopters and/or MiG fighter-bombers would come, 
machine-gunning and firing rockets at any large targets such as a school or a 
warehouse which might still be standing. Utter destruction was clearly 
programmed. When the air attacks were over, the Janjaweed  would arrive, either 
by themselves or in the company o f regular Army units. The militiamen would be 
mounted on horses and camels and often be accompanied by others riding in 
“technicals”. They would surround the village and what followed would vary. In 
the “hard” pattern they would cordon off the place, loot personal belongings, rape 
the girls and women, steal the cattle and kill the donkeys. Then they would bum 
the houses and shoot all those who could not run away. Small children, being 
light, were often tossed back in the burning houses. In the “soft” pattern, the 
militiamen would beat up people, loot, shoot a few recalcitrant men, rape the 
females, often scarring them or branding them with a hot iron so that they would
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become recognizable as “spoilt” women in the future. It is during these “soft” 
attacks that the insults were hurled at the villagers and the references were made 
to their “African” origins which, said the Janjaweed, justified their fate as they 
were “zurga [black]” and the land “now belonged to the Arabs” . Some groups o f 
men and boys were taken away and executed. Girls and women were also 
abducted but, contrary to what happened before in the South, they do not seem to 
have been sold as slaves. They were simply used as sexual toys for a few days 
and then either let go or murdered.
Further, Prunier (2005:102) explains that the Janjaweed spoke to their victims as if  they
understood the gravity o f  their genocidal acts:
genocidal elements were present in the oft-repeated remarks and insults o f the 
attackers who derided their victims as “Blacks” or “like slaves”, who in the future 
would not be allowed to live in Darfur. Some o f the attackers would even clearly 
spell out the economic and ecological motivations for the actions, as when one 
attacker said “You are in the fields, the rest is for our horses. You have nothing 
for yourselves.” Then the facts that the government supported the attacks was 
repeated ad naseum, as if  the perpetrators needed to convince themselves o f their 
good fortune.
The government both knew and sanctioned the Janjaweed to execute the violence 
described above in the villages o f  African tribes. However, as international pressure to 
find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Darfur and South Sudan grew, the government 
placed the blame on the militias and denied collusion or complicity in their acts (Cockett 
2010; Prunier 2005).
The conflict in Darfur is not a spontaneous eruption o f violence. Rather, it is the 
result o f longstanding neglect and political underrepresentation that led rebels groups to 
strike out to demand equality. These attacks were then met with great violence by a 
government-backed militia that sought to destroy villages o f the opposition, typically 
African tribes, to the point o f no return to the village after the attack.
Violence continues to date. When international institutions o f social control and 
other States called for peace and urged the GoS to work towards a resolution, the
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conflicts in Darfur and South Sudan were often lumped together. Although the conflicts 
were very different, violence in southern Sudan muddied the waters o f the Darfur conflict 
because they ran concurrently for a time. Essentially, the South Sudan conflict and 
secession involved the opposition o f  an Islamic government by the primarily Christian 
and animist believers in the south (Prunier 2005). It was this conflict that the peace 
meetings centered upon. In fact, Prunier (2005) notes that Darfur was not a part o f  the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement at all. The peace process will be discussed in great 
detail in the next chapter as the UN and other organizations played a major role in how 
the process evolved. It is mentioned here only generally to point out that the GoS had no 
real desire to bring peace to Darfur. The data findings in the next chapter will review the 
interventions discussed and applied by the UN from 2002 through the end o f June, 2012. 
The discussion o f genocide itself and the power o f labels were not present in this 




The conflict described in the previous chapter was often discussed at the United 
Nations and within the UNSC. Many o f the discussions by UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) members focused on fiscal matters related to intervention, were general reports 
on the deployment o f UNAMID (African Union -  United Nation Mission in 
Darfur)/UNM1S (United Nations Mission in Sudan), or discussed matters related to 
Darfur but not specific to the conflict. The documents included in the sample (n=390) 
contained only those documents with meaningful discussions, (i.e., a member o f the P5, 
the EU, AU, or the offices o f the Secretary-General were involved in the discussion and 
the conflict was discussed specifically and directly). The documents that made up the 
sample will be discussed in detail chronologically.















It is important to note that there were literally hundreds o f  decisions that extended 
mandates for UNMIS, UNAMID, and other UN mechanisms or requested reports from 
stakeholders and investigators. In an effort not to overwhelm with each and every 
discussion/decision related to Darfur, the major items follow. The complex nature o f the 
Darfuri conflict and intervention decisions required that findings be analyzed 
chronologically. That permitted a more holistic understanding o f how the discussions 
evolved over time.
The rebel strike in February 2003 is the incident most often identified as the 
turning point in the protracted Darfuri conflict (Mullins and Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005). 
The analysis period extended to the year prior in an effort to determine if  Darfur was on 
the agenda o f the United Nations or UNSC prior to that point. This was important 
because violence had been a part o f  life in Darfur for more than twenty years before it 
erupted onto the international agenda. There was a single Darfur related document in 
August o f  2002 in which some from the Masalit villages, “claimed that the depopulation 
o f  villages, displacement and changes in land ownership are allegedly part o f  a 
government strategy to alter the demography o f the region” (United Nations 2002:9).
The Government o f  Sudan (GoS) maintained that, “the conflict in Darfur results from 
intertribal disputes deriving from the competition for land between pastoral and crop 
farmers in the area” (United Nations 2002:9).
Greater attention was awarded the violence and conflict after February 2003. For 
example, in March 2003, two NGOs, the World Federation o f  Democratic Youth and 
African Society o f  International and Comparative Law and Interfaith International, 
reported that the Darfuri conflict had undergone a change. The joint statement detailed
that the militia was being used to remove Africans from villages and replace them with 
Arabs, even going so far as changing the names o f villages to Arabic names (United 
Nations 2003c:3). The report identified the roots o f  the conflict as resource scarcity and 
desertification (United Nations 2003c).
The UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) supported Amnesty 
International’s request for a UN inquiry based on the fear that continuation o f  the conflict 
may “destabilize the whole country” (United Nations 2003b:2). Various terms were used 
to describe the conflict, such as a “deteriorating security situation” (United Nations 
2003d:372), ethnic conflict (United Nations 2003d), and “gross, systematic atrocities 
committed against the indigenous people o f the Darfur region” (United Nations 2003a:3).
The word Janjaweed was first used in discussion at the UN in July 2003 (United 
Nations 2003d). It was also at this point that the UN was told that the government was 
arming the Janjaweed, and had been for three decades (United Nations 2003a). Finally, 
the conflict was described as one that required attention and quick resolution (United 
Nations 2003a).
Greater attention was paid to Darfur in 2004. The European Union weighed in for 
the first time in March 2004, stating that it was “alarmed at reports that Janjaweed 
militias continue to systematically target villages and centres [sic] for internally displaced 
persons in their attacks” (United Nations 2004w:2). The first mention o f  the Fur, 
Zaghawa and Masalit as the three groups targeted in the attacks occurred in April 2004 
by the UN Commission on Human Rights (United Nations 2004z).
A special expert on the situation o f human rights in the Sudan was appointed in 
April 2004 and asked to report findings to the General Assembly in later sessions (United
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Nations 2004ae:l 1). The report indicated that the GoS was supporting the Janjaweed and
that the conflict contained ethnic elements (United Nations 2004ad): “ [i]n other words,
and worryingly, what appears to have been an ethnically based rebellion has been met
with an ethnically based response, building in large part on long-standing, but largely
hitherto contained, tribal rivalries” (United Nations 2004ad:6). It was also here that the
African versus Arab nature o f the conflict was first used in a UN document, where
“ [t]hose interviewed invariably described the Janjaweed as being exclusively “Arab”, as
opposed to the victims who were described as “black” or “African” (United Nations
2004ad:l 1). The report summed up the conflict in this way: “ [ajlthough the mission
accepts that there are complex tribal and resource dimensions permeating the current
conflict, it considers that there are other powerful undercurrents rooted in the systematic
marginalization o f certain groups” (United Nations 2004ad:21).
Despite calls for peace, the word genocide was first mentioned in relation to
Darfur on February 4, 2004 but only in question format as to the extent and motivation o f
violence. Acting United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHCHR)
Egeland was asked if  the genocide label was appropriate to the events occurring there; he
instead defined it as a “systematic depopulation o f areas” (United Nations 2004y:2). A
few months later, on June 25, 2004, United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Annan
was asked a similar question in a press conference where he stated:
Let me say that, on the question o f what is happening in Darfur, there has been 
lots o f discussion as to whether it is genocide or ethnic cleansing, and I, myself, in 
Geneva had indicated that, from the report 1 was getting, it was bordering on 
ethnic cleansing. But let me say that the issue is not to discuss what name to give 
i t . .. We don’t need a label to propel us to act, and so 1 think we should act now 
and stop arguing about which label to put on it. (United Nations 2004an)
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The labeling o f the conflict, however, became a major issue in later intervention 
discussions. The Peace and Security Council o f the African Union stated that the conflict 
in Darfur could not be categorized as genocide (United Nations 20041; t) and the Arab 
League agreed (United Nations 20041). The NGO World Education Fund disagreed and 
implored UNSG Annan to invoke the Genocide Convention (United Nations 2004c; e).
In July 2004, the US Congress declared the events in Darfur genocide (United Nations 
2004al).
With continued violence, a September 2004 UNSG press release detailed actions
taken in response to claims o f  genocide in Darfur.
As you know, the Security Council is discussing the resolution on Darfur, which 
may require me to appoint an international commission to decide whether acts o f 
genocide have been com m itted...But I want to make it clear that, no matter how 
the crimes that are being committed against civilians in Darfur are characterized 
or legally defined, it is urgent to take action now ... This is the firs t time in the 
C ouncil’s history that it has ever been seized under article 8 o f  the Genocide 
Convention, and it seems to me inconceivable that it should fail to respond 
(emphasis added). (United Nations 2004q:l)
The International Commission o f  Inquiry into Darfur was officially requested from the
UNSG by the UNSC on September 18, 2004 (United Nations 2004aj), with the support o f
the EU (United Nations 2004v). The Commission o f Inquiry was chaired by Italian
Antonio Cassese, former President o f the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, along with Therese Striggner Scott o f Ghana, Mohamed Fayek o f  Egypt,
Hina Jilani o f Pakistan, Diego Garcia-Sayan o f Peru, and Dumisa Ntsebeza o f South
Africa (United Nations 2004s).
A call to action under the Genocide Convention was not the only avenue o f
intervention discussed at the UN. The responsibility to protect was also mentioned in
relation to Darfur in 2004, here, as will be discussed in the analysis, the use o f R2P has
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significant meaning in the discourse, framing, and labeling o f the conflict. The Canadian
UN representative explained:
[w]e must not let debates about definitions become obstacles to action...Put 
simply, there is still no explicit provision in international law for intervention on 
humanitarian grounds. The responsibility to protect is intended to fill that gap. It 
says that we should have the legal right to intervene in a country on the grounds 
o f  humanitarian emergency alone. We should be able to do so when the 
Government o f a country is unwilling or unable to protect its people from extreme 
harm as a result o f  internal war, repression or, simply, State failure. (United 
Nations 2004j:30-l)
The UNSG supported a similar position before the UNSC where he said that, “ [t]he 
whole world is watching this tragedy unfold, and it is watching us. No one can be 
allowed to sidestep or ignore their responsibility to protect the innocent 
civilians... Whatever name we give it, it imposes responsibilities on all o f us” (United 
Nations 2004ao: 1).
In 2004, the words to describe the conflict include “reign o f terror” (United 
Nations 2004ac:2), “ethnic cleansing” (United Nations 2004d; j; United Nations 2004u: 1; 
United Nations 2004y:3; United Nations 2004ah:3), “one o f  the world’s worst, and one o f 
its most neglected, humanitarian crises” (United Nations 2004y:l), “ethnicity-induced 
and tribally-motivated conflict” (United Nations 2004aa:4), war crimes (United Nations 
2004a; United Nations 2004ab:121), “world’s worst humanitarian crisis” (United Nations 
2004am:2), “gross and systematic violations o f  international humanitarian law” (United 
Nations 2004p:2), crimes against humanity (United Nations 2004a; r; United Nations 
2004ab:12), and genocide (United Nations 2004c; e; i; j; United Nations 2004k:31;
United Nations 2004al).
The following year, 2005, the International Commission o f Inquiry into Darfur 
was formed under the precepts o f the Genocide Convention. The Report o f the
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International Commission o f Inquiry into Darfur (RICID), published in February 2005 
(United Nations 20051), was significant as it was the bedrock for many policy decisions. 
The report’s most important finding was that genocide was not occurring in Darfur but 
that the violence may have genocidal components.
Genocidal intent was ultimately not found based on a several factors. One o f 
those factors was “the attackers refrained from exterminating the whole population that 
had not fled, but instead selectively killed groups o f  young men” (United Nations 
20051:139). Also, those displaced from attacked villages were allowed to live in camps 
that were not targeted by the Janjaweed. The Commission summed their logic by 
explaining that the Government o f  Sudan lacked genocidal intent. The Commission 
found “discriminatory and persecutory intent” in the attacks upon the Fur Masalit, and 
Zaghawa tribes and found the Government o f  Sudan responsible for “murder as a crime 
against humanity., .[and] persecution as a crime against humanity" (United Nations 
20051:141). The report found war crimes and/or crimes against humanity had occurred 
and asked that the UNSC have the International Criminal Court (ICC) conduct an 
investigation into the events in Darfur in relation to individuals who may be responsible 
for said crimes (United Nations 20051). Soon thereafter, the UNSG (United Nations 
2005x:l) stated that “ [t]he Commission has established that the Government o f Sudan 
and the Janjaweed are responsible for crimes under international law.”
After the release o f  the RICID, the UNCHR appointed Emmanuel Akwei Addo as 
an independent expert on the situation o f  human rights in the Sudan (United Nations 
2005k). Despite the RICID, UNSG Annan wanted the African Union to run point on 
Darfur rather than “‘cannibalise’ [sic] the United Nations [northern/southern Sudan]
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peacekeeping mission there for the sake o f Darfur’' (United Nations 2005y: 1). Although 
these conflicts were very different in nature and dynamic, they were often lumped 
together as ‘Sudanese conflicts’ and seen as a single problem. It was specifically stated 
that Darfur should not derail peace in the South (United Nations 2005y), although the 
conflicts were mutually exclusive. However, because the conflicts ran concurrently, they 
were often addressed jointly in UN and UNSC discussions, impacting the framing, 
labeling, and perceived definition o f the situation, as will be discussed more fully in the 
following chapter.
The UNSC then established the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) on 
March 24, 2005 (United Nations 2005o) to work in collaboration with the African Union 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) already underway. On March 31, 2005, the UNSC went on to 
refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC despite opposition from China and the US -  
primarily based upon the protection o f sovereignty (see analysis section for details) 
(United Nations 2005p).
Although not directly labeling the conflict a genocide, many references were 
made to Rwanda and learning a lesson about waiting too long to get involved (United 
Nations 2005j; 2006o; 2008k). Others similarly compared Bosnia/Srebrenica (United 
Nations 2004g; 2005f; g; j; 2006m; 20081) and Yugoslavia (United Nations 2004f; g; h; 
aa; ai; 2005i; j; 2007h; 2012a) with Darfur. “UN Human Rights Coordinator for Sudan, 
Mukesh Kapila...declared that Darfur was “the w orld’s greatest humanitarian crisis” and 
that “the only difference between Rwanda and Darfur is now the number involved” 
(Prunier 2005:126).
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Descriptors o f  the conflict during 2005 included genocide (United Nations 2005d; 
i; w), crimes against humanity (United Nations 20051; x), war crimes (United Nations 
20051; x), “scorched earth policy” (United Nations 2005m: 1), and ethnic cleansing 
(United Nations 2005b). The Special Representative o f  the Secretary-General for the 
Sudan, Jan Pronk, called the conflict “civil war” (United Nations 2005s:3).
During 2006, the Panel o f  Experts described that the conflict had once again 
changed in nature, “(w]hereas previously the large-scale attacks perpetrated by the parties 
to the conflict...posed the most critical threat to the right to life, now the pattern has 
changed to reflect a large number o f discrete violations (rather than large-scale 
violations)” (United Nations 2006e:7). These “discrete violations” are described as 
“violations o f the right to life, violations o f the prohibition o f  torture... rape and other 
forms o f sexual violence; and arbitrary arrest and detention o f  individuals” (United 
Nations 2006e:7).
Another change began in February 2006 with discussions o f  conversion from an 
African Union-led mission in Darfur (AMIS) to one led by the UN -  the United Nations 
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) (United Nations 2006s), here again, depicting diffusion o f 
responsibility as will be discussed more fully in the analysis. Before such 
implementation could occur, however, the UNSC deployed UNMIS into Darfur (United 
Nations 2006k).
Conflict descriptors remained much the same as in previous years and included 
war crimes (United Nations 2006r), crimes against humanity (United Nations 2006r), 
ethnic cleansing (United Nations 2006c; j), and genocide (United Nations 2006a; m). 
UNSG Annan also called Darfur “currently the world’s largest relief operation, some
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13,000 aid workers are struggling to assist 3 million destitute people—  half o f Darfur's 
population’’ (United Nations 2006h:38). The responsibility to protect doctrine (R2P) was 
also discussed several times this year in relation to Darfur (e.g., United Nations 2006g; 
o). UNSG Annan used the word “test” in relation to Darfur when he addressed the R2P 
and Darfur, calling for immediate action.
By 2007, another international body had taken great interest in the matter: the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC handed down arrest warrants related to the 
Darfuri conflict, finding that Ahmad Muhammad Harun, who was previously the 
Sudanese M inister o f  State for the Interior, and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al Rahman, also 
known as Ali Kushayb, head o f  the Janajweed, conspired together to raid villages and 
attack civilians in Darfur. Both men were charged with crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. These two arrest warrants were not the last issued in relation to the crisis.
In addition to protesting the arrest warrants, the Government o f Sudan continued 
to protest the conversion o f  AMIS to the hybrid mission combining UN and AU efforts—  
the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)— due to the 
resulting infusion o f non-African troops into the area. At the Abuja peace talks, it was 
agreed that the UN and AU would jointly appoint certain leadership positions within 
UNAMID, with heavy African involvement in the mission (United Nations 2007i). 
UNAMID was described as “an unprecedented partnership between the United Nations 
and the African Union. It is an expression o f our collective commitment to end the 
tragedy o f Darfur” (United Nations 2007r:2). However, AU Chairperson Konare 
remained hesitant in this endeavor; he explained “that despite the crucial importance o f 
partnership with the international community, and as much as the African Union needed
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its promised support, it was essential that A frica’s partners not intervene unduly. The era 
o f colonialism was over” (United Nations 2007a: 1). This delicate balance between 
intervention without the perception o f interference in state affairs and sovereignty was a 
constant theme in relation to aiding Darfur.
UNAMID was not the only operation established in 2007. The United Nations 
Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) was created in 
September 2007 to address the conflict that spilled across the borders shared with Darfur.
Conflict labels applied in 2007 included war crimes (United Nations 2007g), 
crimes against humanity (United Nations 2007g), genocide (United Nations 2007b; c; d; 
r; u), “gross and systematic violations o f  human rights and grave breaches o f  international 
humanitarian law” (United Nations 2007f:8). President George W. Bush stated that the 
“world’s greatest humanitarian disaster is happening [in Darfur]” (United Nations 
2007r:17) and continued to identify the conflict as genocide at the UN (United Nations 
2007b; r). The UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency 
Relief Coordinator, Sir John Holmes, spoke on the three-year anniversary o f the first 
brief to the UNSC related to Darfur and warned that “the politicization and militarization 
o f  camps have become a fact o f  life, creating a time bomb just waiting to go o f f ’ (United 
Nations 2007p:4). Ban Ki-moon was appointed UNSG in January 2007 and continued 
former-UNSG A nnan’s lead in campaigning for peace in the area and brought attention to 
Darfur often and passionately. He identified the crisis as his “top priority” or “most 
urgent priority” on several occasions (e.g., United Nations 2007e:3; United Nations 
2007k:2; United Nations 2007n:l). ICC Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo summed up 
the situation and his investigation by stating that “ [a]ll information points not to chaotic
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and isolated acts, but to a pattern o f attacks... [cjalling those crimes chaos or ‘sporadic 
violence' or ‘inter-tribal clashes’ is a cover up” (United Nations 2007s:4).
In 2008, attention to Darfur continued. However, much o f the discussions related 
to the crisis focused on UNAMID and its deployment, budget, staffing, and other 
technical matters rather than the conflict itself (i.e., see United Nations 2008a; f; h).
Moreno-Ocampo continued to try to obtain custody o f  Harun and Kushayb, to no 
avail (United Nations 20081). The GoS sustained its denial that it was subject to the 
jurisdiction o f  the ICC, thus ignoring the arrest warrants (United Nations 20081). In June 
o f  2008, the EU began discussing the possibility o f  sanctioning the GoS for failure to 
cooperate with the ICC (United Nations 2008g). The UNSC considered drafting a 
statement in relation to the ongoing lack o f  Sudanese cooperation with the ICC but the 
measure was not passed; Moreno-Ocampo placed the blame for preventing the issuance 
o f  the statement primarily on China (United Nations 2008g) (for more details, see next 
chapter). Further complicating matters, one o f  the indictees, Harun, was appointed 
Minister o f  Humanitarian Affairs (United Nations 2008g).
A related major event in the chronology o f Darfur occurred in July 2008, when 
ICC Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo asked for arrest warrants for President al-Bashir 
(United Nations 2008i). The charges were genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes based on al-Bashir’s statement the he “wantfed] no prisoners or wounded, only 
scorched earth” in Darfur (United Nations 2008n:2). Noted here is the labeling o f  the 
conflict back to genocide as well as crimes against humanity. The request to indict 
President al-Bashir created a host o f negative responses in the United Nations and the 
UNSC. The UK (United Nations 2005u), China (United Nations 2008c; n), the Russian
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Federation (United Nations 2005u; 2008n), the AU (United Nations 2008n), and the 
League o f  Arab States (United Nations 2008n), among others, spoke in reference to the 
impact an attempt to indict the President o f Sudan might have on the peace process 
(United Nations 2005u). Several states, as well as the AU, requested that the ICC either 
terminate or suspend attempts to indict Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir (United 
Nations 2005u).
The word genocide was now linked to Darfur by the request for an arrest warrant 
for the Sudanese President on charges o f  war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide. There were a few other significant ways in which the conflict was discussed in 
2008. For example, the UN Representative from Switzerland portrayed the conflict in 
this manner:
[t]he situation in the Sudan was characterized by a lack o f  fundamental freedoms, 
persistent human rights violations and devastating poverty. It was regrettable that 
the Government had nominated as head o f  a commission to investigate the human 
rights situation in Darfur a person who had been by indicted the International 
Criminal Court. The situation in the Sudan continued to warrant the Council’s full 
attention. (United Nations 2008d:2)
The Executive Secretary o f the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
called Darfur “[t]he biggest humanitarian crisis o f this decade” (United Nations 2008e:2).
Darfur was also lumped in with the northern-southern Sudan conflict as “the longest civil
war in Africa." (United Nations 2008b: 1). Along with the arrest warrant and evidenced-
based charges o f genocide, the year 2008 was also a turning point in the discourse o f  the
conflict and marked decline in the quantity o f discussions o f  Darfur at the UN over the
next few years (see Table 1 and Table 2).
The following year, in early 2009, the charges o f genocide were rejected by the
Pre-Trial Chamber o f the ICC. The appeal on the genocide charge was denied based “on
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the issue o f the correct standard o f  proof at the arrest warrant stage” (United Nations 
2009b:2). This decision was met with much opposition at the UN and UNSC. The 
Russian Federation and China continued to be vocal in their disapproval using words to 
justify their opposition in relation to sovereignty (United Nations 2009c). The AU also 
disagreed with the indictment (United Nations 2009c).
Most o f the discussion in 2010 centered on the arrest warrants issued by the ICC 
in relation to Darfur. Importantly, Moreno-Ocampo announced that once the standard o f 
proof used was corrected, “ [o]n 12 July 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a second 
warrant o f arrest with respect to three counts o f genocide” (United Nations 2010b:3).
This lack o f discussion on Darfur continued through 2011 with only a few notable 
statements
The same pattern continued in 2012. The arrest warrants remained a concern, 
along with the lack o f  cooperation o f  states. There were few other meaningful 
discussions related to Darfur in 2012. The analysis period extended through the end o f 
June, 2012.
This chronology delineates the progression o f discussions related to Darfur. They began 
slowly and grew to be a large part o f the UN and UNSC agendas in 2004, 2005, 2006, 
and 2007. From 2008 through the end o f the analysis period at the end o f  June, 2012, 
both the quantity and quality o f  the discussions turned from the conflict itself to the 
issues surrounding it, such as the funding and make-up o f UNAMID, arrest warrants and 
compliance, and other concerns that brought the focus from the conflict and victims to 
other, more administrative issues. The following, Table 3, lists the words used to 
describe the conflict.
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Table 3. Words Used to Describe the Conflict by Year.
Year Descriptors UN Document Number
2002 “depopulation o f  villages, displacement 
and changes in land ownership are 
allegedly part o f  a government strategy 
to alter the demography o f  the region”
A/57/326
“intertribal disputes deriving from the 
competition for land between pastoral 
and crop fanners in the area”
A/57/326
2003 Government o f  Sudan linked to arming 
o f Janjaweed.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/SR. 19
The conflict was described as one that 
required attention and quick resolution.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/SR.19
The word Janjaweed first used at UN. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/NGO/27




Year Descriptors UN Document Number
2004 “ethnic cleansing” E/CN.4/2004/SR.60, 
A/59/PV.5, S/2004/505, Press 
Briefing on Humanitarian 
Crisis in Darfur Sudan, 
E/2004/SR. 11







“gross and systematic violations o f 
international humanitarian law”
A/59/282
“one o f the world’s worst, and one o f  its Press Briefing on
most neglected, humanitarian crises” Humanitarian Crisis in Darfur 
Sudan
“reign o f  terror” A/59/36
“world’s worst humanitarian crisis” E/2004/SR.37
2005 “civil war” S/PV.5109





“no action” vote E/CN.4/2006/NGO/3
“scorched earth policy” S/2005/68
war crimes S/2005/60, SG/SM/9700- 
A FR /1101
2006 crimes against humanity E/CN.4/2006/71/Add.6
“currently the world’s largest relief 
operation, some 13,000 aid workers are 
struggling to assist 3 million destitute 
people—  half o f Darfur’s population”
A/61/1 (SUPP)
ethnic cleansing E/CN.4/2006/NGO/225. 
A /61/275
genocide A/61/PV.10, S/PV.5434
related to the responsibility to protect 
doctrine
SG/SM/10633, S/PV.5520
“test” o f the responsibility to protect 
doctrine
SC/8823
war crimes E/CN.4/2006/71 /Add.6
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Table 3. Continued.
Year Descriptors UN Document Number
2007 “All information points not to chaotic 
and isolated acts, but to a pattern o f 
attacks.. .[c]alling those crimes chaos or 
‘sproradic violence’ or ‘inter-tribal 
clashes’ is a cover up”
S/PV.5789
crimes against humanity A/HRC/4/80
genocide A/62/PV.4, A/62/PV.9, 
A/62/PV.10, S/PV.5749, 
A/C.3/61/SR.40
“gross and systematic violations o f 
human rights and grave breaches o f 
international humanitarian law”
A/HRC/4/SR.5
“The continuing conflict in Darfur has 
put at stake not only innocent lives and 
the moral imperative to protect them, 
but also the credibility o f the United 
Nations.”
A/62/1 (SUPP)
“The persistence o f  that situation was a 
badge o f shame for the international 
community.”
A/HRC/4/SR.5
“the politicization and militarization o f 
camps have become a fact o f life, 
creating a time bomb just waiting to go 
o f f ’
S/PV.5655
UNSG Ki-moon’s “top priority” or 
“most urgent priority”
A/62/PV.27, A/62/1 (SUPP), 
SG/SM /11153-AFR/l 582
war crimes A/HRC/4/80
“world’s greatest humanitarian disaster” S/PV.5749
2008 “Darfur shows the urgent needs that yet 
have to be met.”
S/PV.5868
“The biggest humanitarian crisis o f this 
decade”
S/2008/125
‘the longest civil war in Africa." D SG/SM /391 -A FR/1692
76
Table 3. Continued.
Year Descriptors UN Document Number
2008 “The situation in the Sudan was 
characterized by a lack o f  fundamental 
freedoms, persistent human rights 
violations and devastating poverty. It 
was regrettable that the Government had 
nominated as head o f  a commission to 
investigate the human rights situation in 
Darfur a person who had been by 
indicted the International Criminal 
Court. The situation in the Sudan 
continued to warrant the Council’s full 
attention”
A/HRC/6/SR.34
“The situation remains grim today, as 
then, if  not worse. Violence targeting 
civilians, including women and girls, 
continues at alarming levels with no 
accountability, or end, in sight.”
SG/SM/11496-AFR/1675
2009 None. Discourse centered on arrest 
warrants o f  President al-Bashir and 
repercussions.
2010 None. Discourse centered on arrest 
warrants o f  President al-Bashir and 
repercussions.
2011 None. Discourse centered on arrest 
warrants o f  President al-Bashir and 
repercussions.
2012 None. Discourse centered on arrest 
warrants o f  President al-Bashir and 
repercussions.
While the significance o f the discourse used to define the situation in Darfur will 
be analyzed in the following section, it is essential to note how many times each P5 state 
was involved in the discourse related to Darfur (see Table 4). It is also important to
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connect the discourse to the chronology o f UN interventions and policy decisions as 
noted in Table 5.







China France Russian United Kingdom United States
Federation
Table 5. Summary o f  UN D ecision s and Interventions Included in C ase Study.
Date UN Document Number Decision/Intervention Abstentions
23-Apr-2004 E/CN.4/2004/L.1 l/Add.8 UN Commission on Human Rights (UNHRC) asks for 
appointment o f  an Independent Expert on the Situation o f 
Human Rights in the Sudan
11-Jun-2004 S/RES/1547 UNSC created UNAMIS (UN Advance M ission in Sudan) 
as a "special political mission" to address the peace process
30-Jul-2004 S/RES/1556 UNSC demands disarmament and prosecution o f  
Janjaweed, establishes arms embargo, state that further 
non-military options will be used i f  GoS noncompliant, 
asks for monthly reports from UNSG on the situation
China
7-Aug-2004 A/58/PV UNSG creates Special Advisor on the Prevention o f  
Genocide (and other massive violations o f  human rights)
18-Sep-2004 S/RES/1564 Requested UNSG create International Comm ission o f  
Inquiry into Darfur to determine if  conflict genocidal, also 





18-Sep-2004 AFR/1027-HR/4793 United Nations High Comm issioner and Special Adviser 
on the Prevention o f Genocide visit Darfur
11-Oct-2004 S/2004/812 UNSG creates Commission o f  Inquiry requested in 
S/RES/1556 and delineates their goals. Requests that it 
report findings within 90 days.
31-Oct-2004 S/RES/1569 UNSC plans meeting in Nairobi for Novem ber 18-19, 2004 
to talk peace in Sudan
1-Feb-2005 S/2006/60 Report o f  the International Commission o f  Inquiry into 
Darfur. Request referral o f  Darfur to ICC for possible war 
crimes and crimes against humanity
1-Feb-2005 SG/SM /9700-AFR/1101 UNSG supported referral to ICC but noted that is 
something only UNSC can carry out
oo
Table 5. Continued.
Date UN Document Number Dec i s ion/Intervention Abstentions
28-Feb-2005 E/CN.4/2005/11 UN Commission on Human Rights appoints Independent 
Expert on the Situation o f Human Rights in the Sudan
24-Mar-2005 S/R ES/1590 UNSC created UNMIS to work alongside AMIS and focus 
on the CPA and peace in Darfur (Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement) (UNMIS replacing UNAM IS)
29-Mar-2005 S/R ES/1591 Requested the UNSG appoint Panel o f  Experts, created 




31-Mar-2005 S/R ES/1593 UNSC refers Darfur to ICC. ICC to report w ithin three 
months then semiannually thereafter
China,
United States
12-Apr-2005 S/2005/82 UNSG appoints Special Rapporteur on the Situation o f 
Human Rights in the Sudan
23-Sep-2005 S/RES/1627 UNSC extended UNMIS mandate and request quarterly 
report o f  the mission by the UNSG
3-Feb-2005 S/PRST/2006/5 UNSC request UNSG create plan for transition from AMIS 
to AU/UN Joint Mission in Darfur (UNAM ID)
25-Apr-2006 S/RES/1672 UNSC imposed travel bans and froze the assets o f M ajor 
General Gaffar M ohamed Elhassan (Commander o f the 
Western Military Region for the Sudanese Armed Forces), 
Sheikh Musa Hilal (Paramount C hief o f  the Jalul Tribe in 
North Darfur), Adam Yacub Shant (Sudanese Liberation 
Army Commander), Gabril Abdul Kareem Badri (National 
Movement for Reform and Development Field 
Commander) for failure to comply with UNSC decisions
26-Apr-2006 S/2006/341 UNSC to visit Sudan and Chad
28-Jul-2006 S/2006/591 UNSG proposed UNAMID to begin 01/01/07 (pending 
consent by GoS)____________________________________
Table 5. Continued.
Date UN Document Number Decision/Intervention Abstentions
31-Aug-2006 S/RES/1706 UNSC support UNAM ID recommendation China,
Russian
Federation
4-Dec-2006 A/HRC/S-4/L. 1 UNHRC to send "urgent assessment mission to Darfur"
9-Feb-2007 A /61/530/Add. 2 UNHRC sends High Level Panel to address violations o f  
human rights in Sudan
7-Mar-2007 A/HRC/4/80 UNHRC report indicates AU, UN/UNSC actions thus far 
ineffective at stemming tide o f  violence in Darfur. Both 
sides o f conflict violating decisions by UN and its bodies
22-Mar-2007 A/HRC/4/L.7 UNHRC sends Special Rapporteur on the Situation o f
Human Rights in the Sudan, Special Representative o f  the 
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict,
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions, Special Representative o f  the Secretary- 
General on the Situation o f  Human Rights Defenders, 
Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms o f Racism, 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance, Representative o f  the Secretary-General on 
Human Rights o f  Internally Displaced Persons, Special 
Rapporteur on the Question o f  Torture, and the Special 
Rapporteur on Violence against W omen, its Causes and 
Consequences to Darfur________________________________
31-Jul-2007 S/RES/1769 UNSC authorizes UNAMID deployment
25-Sep-2007 S/RES/1778 UNSC establishes the United Nations M ission in the 
Central African Republic and Chad (M INURCAT) to aid 
refugees and IDPs from Darfur
Table 5. Continued.
Date UN Document Number Decision/Intervention Abstentions
14-Feb-2008 S/RES/1778 UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations 
went to Darfur to iron out remaining details o f  UNAM ID 
deployment with GoS
16-Jun-2008 S/PRST/2008/21 UNSC asks for GoS cooperation with ICC arrest warrants
31-Jul-2008 S/RES/1828 UNAMID mandate renewed United States
7-Jan-2011 S/2011/7 UNSC "visited the Sudan in order to reaffirm the 
commitment o f  the international community to and its 
support for the full and timely im plementation o f the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement and to encourage a 





The previous chapter discussed the data that emerged from the discourse o f the 
conflict and a chronology o f the decisions and interventions by the UN into Darfur. The 
discourse and subsequent decision-making in terms o f intervention has significant 
implications. The following will address this drawing from the theoretical framework 
presented in Chapter III.
When Darfur emerged on the international agenda, it was identified as a tribal or 
ethnic conflict (United Nations 2003d) or as rebels striking out against their government. 
This continued to be the case until 2004 when the International Commission o f  Inquiry 
into Darfur was sent to investigate the reports o f  genocide in Darfur (United Nations 
2004s; af; ag). The labels o f  crimes against humanity and war crimes applied by the UN 
in 2005 with the RICID (United Nations 20051) dictated every decision and intervention 
that followed. This early discourse framed perceived definitions o f  the situation o f  the 
international political players as well as caused strain and subsequent diffusion o f 
responsibility.
Following the RICID (United Nations 20051:4), the determination “that the 
Government o f Sudan has not pursued a policy o f genocide” meant that UN or UNSC 
intervention was no longer mandatory. It is important to note that the RICID (United 
Nations 20051) contradicted findings by other international actors and scholars. Armenia 
was the first to call Darfur “the twentieth century’s first genocide” (United Nations 
20051), but would not be the last (e.g., Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2009; Heinze
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2007; Jafari and Williams 2005; Markusen 2009; Mullins and Rothe 2007; 2008; Prunier 
2005; Rothe and Mullins 2007; United Nations 2004i; m; 2005e). In 2004, the US 
Congress called Darfur a genocide (United Nations 2004m: 17), as did President George 
W. Bush in a speech at the UN (Markusen 2009; Prunier 2005) and the European 
Parliament (United Nations 2004al). “The increased level o f international interest in the 
Darfur crisis following the invocation o f the term “genocide” seems to confirm the power 
o f the “G-word”” (Mennecke 2009:168).
Some o f  the findings that contradicted the RICID were completed after the initial 
report however. This included the involvement o f  the ICC and subsequent arrest 
warrants for three counts o f genocide against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in 2010 
(United Nations 2010b). Additionally, individual statements by the US (United Nations 
2004i) and the European Parliament (United Nations 2005e) identified Darfur as a 
genocide. Despite the use o f  the genocide label by others, the UN and UNSC stood 
behind the determination o f crimes against humanity. This gap between the reality o f  the 
situation and the perception o f  it by the UN and UNSC (Perinbanayagam 1974; Rothe 
2009b), I believe, highlights the impact on the political player’s definition o f the 
situation.
This is the case even though the data detailed in the findings chapter indicated that
there was sufficient evidence available to the International Commission o f  Inquiry into
Darfur and major political players to identify the conflict as genocide. Consider the
statement that later came out o f the Sudanese government:
Adam Hamid Musa, recent Governor o f South Darfur, [who] threatened that there 
would be ‘more genocide such as has never before been seen by anyone’ if  
President Al-Bashir were indicted; and President Al-Bashir him self said, ‘We are
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not looking for problems, but if  they come to us, then we will teach them a lesson 
that they will not forget.’ (United Nations 2008n-3)
These statements indicated that Sudanese government officials themselves were
identifying the conflict in Darfur as genocide while the UN was not. Additionally, there
were a host o f others that found genocide was occurring in Darfur, most importantly the
International Criminal Court (United Nations 2010b).
The contradiction between labels, discourse and subsequent labeling o f  the
conflict can only partially be attributed to perceived definition o f the situation, given that
such perceptions are often formed to align with state interests (as will be discussed more
fully below). The perceived definition o f the situation also allows the justification for
diffusion o f responsibility that was a factor in the years covered in this case study.
Additionally, with the RICID findings o f  non-genocide, the UNSC was able to
defer the situation, regardless o f  individual players perceived definition o f the situation
and calls for intervention, to other organizations, including the ICC (United Nations
20051). In this manner, the UNSC deferred responsibility for further investigation to the
ICC and could maintain a “hands clean” position, accepting or neutralizing their
decisions based o ff o f the official RICID findings. The UNSC could pronounce that the
UN had investigated, found crimes against humanity, and referred the matter to another
body for further inquiry. Therefore, the UNSC had executed its responsibility fully.
Another example o f the diffusion o f responsibility may be found in the
deployment o f the AU for as long as possible in Darfur before the UN stepped in. In the
early years o f the conflict, the UN and the African Union agreed that the AU should
spearhead the interventions and the UN was to provide support only, consistent with the
“African solutions to African problems” ideology o f the AU and the desire to keep
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former colonizers out o f  the continent to the largest extent possible. The UN stated that 
“ [cjlearly everyone's first preference is for the African Union to stay in the lead in 
Darfur, but for the rest o f us to give it more effective help, while keeping other options 
open” (United Nations 2005y:l). This diffusion o f  responsibility allowed the UN to 
remain bystanders to the conflict for as long as possible, until, ultimately the AU force 
was deemed insufficient and the joint mission UNAMID was formed in 2007 (United 
Nations 20071).
However, after the ICC found evidence o f  genocide, the original definition o f 
crimes against humanity was never revisited or revised. I will suggest this, too, is based 
on the contradiction between moral obligations and states’ interests that have played out, 
from extending the arms o f responsibility to others as well as using the ideology o f 
sovereignty to ensure protection o f some o f the UNSC voting members’ own internal 
political, economic and military interests.
The diffusion o f responsibility was also way for states to neutralize the strain o f 
competing interests, between moral obligation and individual state’s vested economic, 
political and military interests. Strain was a factor in the UN and UNSC decision­
making, primarily in the form o f pressure from individual states, NGOs, IGOs, the media, 
and other activist and/or organizations that called for the labeling o f genocide as well as 
UN action from the onset and as the situation in Darfur worsened. This strain can also be 
interpreted as the outcome o f competing interests o f  states: moral obligation, political 
pressure and states vested self-interests. For example, US Senator and Presidential 
Candidate John Kerry explained simply that the US could not provide more than 
humanitarian assistance to Darfur was because “we’re [militarily] overextended” (New
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York Times 2004:15). Several UN and NGO documents (i.e., Amnesty International 
2012; Human Rights First N.d.; United Nations 2009a; United Nations Security Council 
2007) link both China and the Russian Federation to ammunition found in Darfur despite 
the arms embargo instituted by the UNSC in 2004 (United Nations 2004af; 2009a).
Sudan has separate oil contracts with the US, France, and China (United Nations 2007j). 
The vested and competing interests in Sudan by these states created strain in relation to 
Darfuri intervention. Additionally, the trend o f documents that involved discussions o f 
Darfur is the result o f this external pressure as evidenced by the increase in documents 
referencing the situation. There were only five documents doing so in 2003, then 90 in 
2004, 92 in 2005, and 60 in 2006 (see Table 2). Pressure to intervene was not the only 
form o f strain present.
As highlighted by international relations theory, states may refuse to commit to 
the right or moral course o f  action because it may be inconsistent with the opposing, but 
equally strong, desire for protection o f self-interest and security at all costs. As noted, the 
competing interests o f states, including the ongoing contradiction o f  some between their 
perceived definition o f the situation (i.e., US) and their support (or lack thereof) for 
adhering to the Genocide Convention played a major role in the decision-making process 
at the UN and UNSC. Many states, including the P5, expressed a desire to intervene in 
Darfur but none provided assistance that would reduce the state’s existing level o f power. 
Additionally, there was evidence o f strain and competing interests in terms o f specific 
states’ interests, much o f which translated into arguing for the importance o f  recognizing 
state sovereignty.
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The deference to Sudan’s sovereignty was declared as a major factor in the
decision-making for intervention, first by non-use o f  the Genocide Convention that was
‘justified’ through the alternative labeling o f  crimes against humanity and subsequently
through discussion o f using the R2P ideology or doctrine. The U N ’s High Level Panel
on Threats, Challenges and Change explained the limits to sovereignty when discussing
the Responsibility to Protect doctrine:
[t]he successive humanitarian disasters in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, 
Kosovo and now Darfur, Sudan, have concentrated attention not on the immunities o f 
sovereign Governments but their responsibilities, both to their own people and to the 
wider international community. There is a growing recognition that the issue is not 
the “right to intervene” o f  any State, but the “responsibility to protect” o f  every State 
when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe— mass murder and 
rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and 
exposure to disease. And there is a growing acceptance that while sovereign 
Governments have the primary responsibility to protect their own citizens from such 
catastrophes, when they are unable or unwilling to do so that responsibility should be 
taken up by the wider international community (emphasis in original). (United 
Nations 2004g:56-7)
This sentiment was echoed by the ICISS and the World Summit Outcome Document 
(United Nations 2005a) (see also Hubert 2010; United Nations Security Council 2006), 
none o f which tie these responsibilities to a determination o f  genocide
Nonetheless, the sovereignty o f  Sudan was a common theme throughout the data, 
primarily from several states, including Sudan. Sudan made several demands upon the 
UN in regards to protection o f its sovereignty and the UN/UNSC conceded each time.
For example, Sudan demanded that a UNAMID be primarily African to keep former 
colonizing western nations from interfering (United Nations 2006d; f; 2007a). The UN 
relented (United Nations 2006i). Sudan denied travel visas into Darfur for UN delegates 
on several occasions (United Nations 2007g).
The Thirty-Second Session o f the Islamic Conference:
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Reiterate[d] its full solidarity with Sudan in consolidating peace and stability 
countrywide and in defending its sovereignty and integral unity, and in this regard 
calls upon the international community to adhere to the full observance o f 
Sudan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. (United Nations 2005n:65)
The Special Representative o f the Secretary-General for the Sudan, Jan Pronk explained
that the United Nations’ “only aim is to protect the people, while respecting the
sovereignty o f  the Sudanese nation” (United Nations 2006p:5). The UK made a
statement that:
We must therefore redouble our efforts —  in the United Nations, the AU, the 
European Union, the League o f  Arab States and the Organization o f the Islamic 
Conference —  as friends o f  the Sudan and its peoples, to make clear the positive 
contribution the United Nations will make in Darfur, in full respect o f  the 
sovereignty o f  the Sudan and with a heavy African character to the force, as the 
Council has repeatedly made clear. (United Nations 2006p:7)
Protection o f  sovereignty was also important to the P5. For example, although
proclaiming to be in support o f peace throughout the analysis period, the voting behavior
o f China did not reconcile with its formal discourse. I suggest that this, in part, is due to
China’s long standing foreign policy o f  soft power and non-intervention in sovereign
territory as well as its vested interests in the area. Here again, it should be noted that such
a position, soft power, is grounded in a deeper self-interest given the historical record o f
human rights violations and general oppression within China and realistic need to ensure
non-external intervention in their domestic affairs. China summed its position in this
manner:
China has worked in a consistent, active and responsible manner to advance the 
peace process in the Sudan, devoting great attention to finding an appropriate 
solution to the problems o f Darfur. We have often pointed out to the Sudan that 
the only objective o f  the United Nations in taking over the task o f  AMIS is to help 
the Sudan implement the Darfur Peace Agreement. That is also the broad 
consensus o f the international community. We hope that the Government o f  the 
Sudan will proceed from the perspective o f its long-term development and take a 
flexible approach. At the same time, we consider that the Security Council should
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respect the views o f  the national Government in question and that no United 
Nations peacekeeping operation should be imposed. Moreover, we must pay heed 
to the influence and the roles o f the relevant regional organizations. We believe 
that if  all the parties take a frank and pragmatic approach, enhance mutual trust 
and cooperation and broaden their perspective, we will certainly be able to 
achieve an outcome that is satisfactory to everyone. (United Nations 2006o:12)
However, a 2007 statement by the Coalition for the International Criminal Court
stated:
when Mr. Ocampo had last briefed the Council this past December, it ‘was 
principally the obstruction o f the China that prevented the Council from adopting 
a statement’. The Coalition hoped that China -  ‘with its aspirations to play a 
leading role on the world stage, with the ‘coming out party’ for that role in the 
form o f the Beijing Olympics just two months away’ — would take a more 
reasonable and nuanced view as to where it stood in relationship to bringing to 
justice those responsible for horrific crimes committed against the people o f 
Darfur. ‘It would certainly be sorrowful to see the Olympic Games tainted with an 
example o f Chinese support or complicity for the obstruction o f  justice by Sudan.’ 
(United Nations 2008g: 1)
China’s voting behavior displayed the state’s government-first, sovereignty above all else
stance, as stated, to protect domestic interests and its own self-protection from external
intervention. Consider the importance o f  Sudan to China’s economic and political power;
China and Sudan have a history o f  agreement in return for soft power policy -  most
notably in terms o f economic ‘development’ (United Nations 2007j). “Aside from
building Sudan’s oil production infrastructure, such as the 930-mile pipeline from the
southern oilfields to Port Sudan, China also invested about $20 billion in non-oil projects,
such as roads, agriculture projects and power stations” (Cockett 2010:273). Sudan is not
the only African state in which China invested in development (Cockett 2010; United
Nations 2007j). However, “[t]o put that figure into perspective, Britain’s aid
development budget in 2006 to the whole world  was about $8 billion” (emphasis in
original) (Cockett 2010:273). China won a bid to build a $650 million dam in Sudan in
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2004 (Cockett 2010). Additionally, “[i]n 2007, China cancelled Sudanese debts worth 
$80m[illion] and also promised to build a new presidential palace worth $12m[illion]” 
(Cockett 2010:274).
Oil was an additional economic impetus for the pro-Sudanese government 
decisions made by China. China and Sudan have a long-standing oil trade agreement 
(Cockett 2010; Prunier 2005). That agreement was debated at the UN, where a Chinese 
representative explained that “ [t]he relationship between China and the Sudan was 
similar to its relations with other African countries. It was nothing special, as China 
maintained friendly and cooperative relations with all the other African countries”
(United Nations 2007j: 1). Prunier (2005) places Sudanese exports to China in 2005 at 
$3.4 billion, 96% o f which were petroleum related. This adds to the evidence o f  a 
mutually beneficial relationship that is important to both states and central to the 
realpolitik evident therein.
Another economic relationship between the two governments is manifest in the 
proliferation o f arms into Sudan that has been linked to China (see Amnesty International 
2012; Cockett 2010; United Nations 2009a). Chinese arms were located in Darfur 
despite the arms embargo levied by the UNSC (United Nations 2009a). “China is also 
frequently accused o f  having built two (or maybe even three) small-arms factories in 
Khartoum that supply the government with weapons” (Cockett 2010:277). There were 
several reports indicating a twenty-five-fold increase in Chinese arms sales from 2002-
2005 (e.g., Cockett 2010; Heavens 2007). Additionally, Reuters (Heavens 2007) reported 
a 124% increase in trade o f weapons through mid-2007 compared to the year before. 
Cockett (2010:277) interviewed a Chinese embassy representative, who explained that
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“China sold some weapons to Sudan, but ‘only on the understanding that they are not 
used in Darfur.’” In 2009, a panel investigated the proliferation o f Chinese-manufactured 
arms in Darfur in spite o f the UNSC arms embargo o f S/RES/1556 (2004af) and two 
stolen Chinese-donated containers o f  weapons and ammunitions in transit to UNAMID 
troops (United Nations 2009a). This investigation was not mentioned again in the 
documents drawn on here.
The data indicated that China’s voting behavior often reflected a very pro- 
Govemment o f Sudan stance. This may be seen in China’s vociferous disagreement with 
the indictment o f  President al-Bashir, the involvement o f the ICC in general and the 
identification o f the crimes as less than genocidal (United Nations 2005u; 2008c; m; n; 
2009c). China identified the conflict in manners that reduced the seriousness and level o f 
violence in the region (United Nations 2007t), as well as downplayed the extent o f  the 
relationship between the two states (United Nations 2007j) and the involvement o f  the 
government in Darfur (United Nations 2007q). For example, in “May 2007[,] Liu Giu 
Jin, China’s new Darfur Special Envoy, returned from a visit to the ravaged region and 
declared with a straight face that ‘the situation in Darfur is now basically norm al’” 
(Prunier 2005:179). By other accounts described throughout this work, Darfur was far 
from normal -  in 2007 or at any point thereafter. Chinese representatives at the UN and 
UNSC often made statements against, as well as abstained or voted against, measures 
aimed at forcing the hand o f the Government o f Sudan in terms o f  addressing the conflict 
(United Nations 2004aj; ak; al; 2005r; 2006n; o; 2007r). ICC Chief Prosecutor Moreno- 
Ocampo went as far as to make a statement about the level o f Chinese support for Sudan:
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“when Mr. Ocampo had last briefed the Council this past December, it ‘was principally
the obstruction o f the China that prevented the Council from adopting a statem ent'”
(United Nations 2008g:l). Protecting the extensive economic relationship that the two
states share was, and is, in the best interest o f China as can be seen in Chinese statements
and votes throughout the data.
The US was a vocal supporter o f Darfur and the achievement o f peace. In fact,
the US referenced Darfur more than any o f the remaining P5. The US Congress labeled
Darfur genocide in July 2004 (United Nations 2004al). Soon thereafter, the US
representative said, “It is important that we not become bogged down over words. It is
essential that the Security Council act quickly, decisively and with unity. We need to fix
this humanitarian problem now” (United Nations 2004al:4). The US supported AMIS
financially from early in the conflict (United Nations 2004af; am). The US described its
actions related to Darfur in this manner:
President Bush was the first head o f State to speak out publicly on the 
humanitarian crisis in Darfur. We were the first to highlight Darfur at the Security 
Council, the first to state that genocide had occurred in Darfur and the first to call 
for accountability for perpetrators o f  violence and atrocities, as well as being a 
lead donor on humanitarian assistance, with more than $506 million in food aid to 
Darfur and eastern Chad since the Darfur crisis began. We appreciate Under- 
Secretary-General Egeland’s reminder o f  what remains to be done by us all. 
(United Nations 2005v: 12)
President George W. Bush labeled Darfur genocide at the UN (e.g., United Nations
2004i; United Nations 2007b). In 2004, Secretary o f State Colin Powell testified before
Congress and called Darfur genocide (Powell 2004b). Also, in 2011, Secretary o f  State
Condoleezza Rice also identified Darfur as genocide (United Nations 2012a).
This is interesting when compared to the U S’ use o f the word genocide, or lack 
thereof, to define Rwanda a few years earlier (see Chapter II) (Flint and de Waal 2008;
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Heinze 2007; Jafari and Williams 2005; Power 2001; 2002). The US used “genocidal
acts” to define the events in Rwanda where 800,000 people were killed in a three-month
period in 1994 (Power 2001; 2002). Power (2001:6) explained the US dance around
what she calls “the g-word” :
[a] discussion paper on Rwanda, prepared by an official in the Office o f the 
Secretary o f Defense and dated May 1, testifies to the nature o f official thinking. 
Regarding issues that might be brought up at the next interagency working group, 
it statedf;] Genocide Investigation: Language that calls for an international 
investigation o f human rights abuses and possible violations o f the genocide 
convention. Be Careful. Legal at State was worried about this yesterday—  
Genocide finding could commit [the U.S. government] to actually “do 
something.”
Menneke (2009) also noted this memo in his writings. The US avoided the use o f the 
word genocide to define the events occurring in Rwanda at the time for fear o f triggering 
an intervention requirement, specifically militaristically, in the Genocide Convention.
This was inconsistent with the US approach to defining Darfur as genocide. In 
fact, US Secretary o f  State Colin Powell stated; “some seem to have been waiting for this 
determination o f genocide to take action. In fact, however, no new action is dictated by 
this determination” (Powell 2004a; b). This was in stark contrast to the Department o f 
Defense memo noted above. It seems that the Genocide Convention was reinterpreted 
between the Clinton and Bush administrations and that “doing something” was no longer 
required upon application o f  the word genocide to a conflict. The Bush administration 
was then willing to state that genocide was occurring in Darfur “without an expectation 
o f [militarized] intervention” (Heinze 2007:362). The more recent US interpretation of 
the Genocide Convention simply requires some sort o f action to prevent or punish future 
genocidal acts, which the US felt was satisfied with its request for an investigation by the 
UNSC into the events in Darfur (Flint and de Waal 2008) (see United Nations 2004o; ag).
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This resulted in the formation o f an international commission o f  inquiry, which 
culminated in the Report o f  the International Commission o f Inquiry into Darfur (RIC1D) 
(United Nations 20051).
This was self-serving because it satisfied the demands for action by several 
activist groups in the US but distanced the government from any real action, such as that 
which was feared the determination o f  genocide would engender in Rwanda. This 
allowed the US to be seen as a champion o f human rights while not requiring the 
investment o f military or economic resources. The humanitarian goodwill achieved by 
requesting an investigation in Darfur was the return earned on a small political 
investment by the US. This is an example o f  the moral relativism in international 
relations as described by Bjola (2009). Based in the neorealist school o f international 
relations, and seen here, legitimacy and morality were mutually exclusive.
The US financially supported both the AU and UN missions into Darfur many 
times over the course o f the conflict (United Nations 2004n; af; am; 2005q; v; 2006q).
The data also indicated that US representatives at the UNSC often spoke o f  the Darfuri 
conflict in terms that exhibited a desire to address the situation, as well as called for 
action to do so (United Nations 2004i; al; am; 2005c; w; 2006b; 1; m; n; o; 2007r; 20081; 
n; 2009d; 2012a). Statements such as “ [t]he Sudan remains a top priority for the United 
States” (United Nations 2005v:2), “ [e]nding the violence in Darfur remains one o f the 
highest priorities for the United States” (United Nations 2006q:10), and “ [t]he brutal 
treatment o f innocent civilians in Darfur is unacceptable to the United States” (United 
Nations 2007q:7) also evidence the US position on the conflict. Additionally, “President 
Bush made a promise to the people o f D arfur...‘[t]he United States will not avert our
95
eyes from a crisis that challenges the conscience o f  the world’” (United Nations 
2007q:8). Other statements, such as “ [i]n Sudan, innocent civilians are suffering 
repression; and in the Darfur region, many are losing their lives to genocide...The United 
Nations must answer this challenge to conscience “ (United Nations 2007b:9), “ [t]his 
Council cannot ignore the terrible crimes that have occurred throughout the conflict in 
Darfur and the massive human suffering that the world has witnessed” (United Nations 
2005u:8), and:
[c]an we in conscience leave the people o f Darfur to such a fate? Can the 
international community, having not done enough for the people o f  Rwanda in 
their time o f need, just watch as this tragedy deepens? Having finally agreed —  
just one year ago —  that there is a responsibility to protect, can we contemplate 
failing yet another test? Lessons either learned or not, principles either upheld or 
scorned, this is no time for the middle ground o f half measures or further debate. 
(United Nations 2006o:3)
The US made many statements about addressing Darfur and allotted funds to do
the same. However, this appears to be to appease the demands o f  the public in America
in relation to Darfur. The US, as with other countries, took a symbolic appeasement
approach to maintain legitimacy while ensuring state interests dictate action. The US was
so over-extended militarily that it could not or would not commit soldiers. Senator, and
Presidential candidate, John Kerry explained lack o f  military intervention in Darfur in
this way during a presidential debate in September 2004 (New York Times 2004:13, 15):
Senator Kerry: ... And the world is more dangerous. Darfur has a genocide. The 
world is more dangerous. I'd have made a better choice...
Mr. Lehrer: New question, two minutes. Senator Kerry, you mention Darfur, the 
Darfur region o f Sudan, 50,000 people have already died in that area, more than a 
million are homeless. It has been labeled an act o f ongoing genocide, yet neither 
one o f you or anyone else connected with your campaigns or your administration 
that I can find has discussed the possibility o f  sending in troops. Why not?
Senator Kerry: Now, with respect with Darfur, yes, it is a genocide. And months 
ago, many o f  us were pressing for action. I think the reason that we're not saying 
send American troops in at this point is several fold. No. 1, we can do this through
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the African Union, providing we give them the logistical support. Right now all 
the president is providing is humanitarian support. We need to do more than that. 
They've got to have the logistical capacity to go in and stop the killing. And that's 
going to require more than is on the table today. 1 also believe that it is -  one o f 
the reasons we can't do it is we're overextended. Ask the people in the armed 
forces today. We've got guards in reserves who are doing double duties. We've 
got a backdoor draft taking place in America today. People with stop-loss 
programs where they're told you can't get out o f  the military. Nine out o f  our 10 
active duty divisions committed to Iraq one way or the other, either going, coming 
or preparing. So this is the way the president has overextended the United States.
The political rhetoric indicated a desire to end the conflict but the words did not seem to
match the action. Cohen’s (1975) cost versus benefit analysis is applicable as the US
would not commit militarily
This divide between the US words and actions, other than financial contributions,
appeared to be politically motivated. With the reinterpretation o f the Genocide
Convention to satisfy demands for action by US activists, the US took the approach o f
persuasive and often support o f  addressing the conflict while it avoided intervention that
might require investment other than financially. In addition, the US endorsed the R2P in
relation to Darfur in stating that:
[ujnless security improves, we face the prospect o f  having to drastically curtail an 
acutely needed humanitarian operation. Can we in conscience leave the people o f 
Darfur to such a fate? Can the international community, having not done enough 
for the people o f Rwanda in their time o f need, just watch as this tragedy 
deepens? Having finally agreed—just one year ago— that there is a responsibility 
to protect, can we contemplate failing yet another test? Lessons either learned or 
not, principles either upheld or scorned, this is no time for the middle ground o f 
half measures or further debate. (United Nations 2006o:3)
Sudan was characterized as “a top priority for the United States” (United Nations
2005v:2). The US applied economic sanctions against Sudan due to the Darfuri conflict
(United Nations 2010a). In 2006, the US sent a Special Envoy to Darfur in an effort to
aid the peace process (United Nations 2006a). The US sought intervention and aid to
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Darfur from early on and throughout the conflict. Yet. realpolitik played a major role in
the discourse and action taken by the US in relation to the conflict in Darfur.
Here again, the issue is related to the situation o f  the United States and its ongoing
war on terrorism and efforts to ensure protection o f  US interests, including the potential
backlash to the former political administration and the illegalities that were committed in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo. Consider, for example, the US did not agree with the
referral o f Darfur to the ICC because o f the idea the that ICC “should be able to exercise
jurisdiction over the nationals, including government officials, o f States not party to the
Rome Statute... strikes at the essence o f the nature o f  sovereignty” (United Nations
2005u:3). The US abstained on the referral vote (United Nations 2005u). A few months
later, the US representative stated:
[wjhile our concerns about the Court have not changed, we would like to move 
beyond divisiveness on the issue. We share the commitment o f parties to the 
Rome Statute to bring to justice those who perpetrate genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. While we have honest differences on how accountability 
is best achieved, we must work together to ensure that perpetrators o f the 
atrocities are held accountable for their actions. (United Nations 2005h:10)
In further protection o f sovereignty, several P5 members spoke o f
desiring/requiring consent by the GoS before proceeding with interventions. The Russian
Federation (RF) abstained in the vote to transition to UNAMID without GoS consent
(United Nations 2006n:9). The Russian Federation made several comments during the
discussions about obtaining consent and cooperation o f the host government before
proceeding— here again, a position used to neutralize potential threats to their domestic
self-interests and protection. There were also several discussions related to sanctioning
the GoS for failure to abide by UNSC resolutions and the ICC arrest warrants. The
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Russian Federation abstained from voting in relations to sanctions (United Nations 
2004aj; 2005t).
Recall that the discourse related to Darfur was dominated by the United States. In 
fact, the US had almost twice as many mentions in the data than the second most vocal 
P5 state, China. France and the United Kingdom followed respectively, leaving the 
Russian Federation with little participation in the discourse and offering less in terms o f 
political arguments that undergirded voting behavior. This may be related to the P5 
consensus with the other states often explaining their voting behavior, while the Russian 
Federation chose not to do so. It is most likely that the Russian Federation simply had 
fewer competing interests, desires, or political statements that needed to be vocalized in 
terms o f  its voting behavior.
Alternately, the voting behavior o f France and the UK was discussed at length. 
Both states indicated less attention to the protection o f Sudan’s sovereignty in an effort to 
achieve peace -  aligning more with the historical position o f the two countries (post­
colonialism). France’s voting behavior and discussions indicated a desire for peace and 
accountability in Darfur. It supported the responsibility to protect in Darfur-related 
discussions at the UN (United Nations 2006a). France never labeled the conflict in 
Darfur genocide in the documents reviewed in this work, but it did fully support 
compliance with the arrest warrants issued by the ICC (United Nations 2008g; 2011). 
Additionally, French President Sarkozy moved “twenty-fifth France- Africa Summit to 
avoid meeting with a person who is the object o f an arrest warrant” (United Nations 
2010c:3). France also linked the R2P to Darfur (United Nations 2006a). When 
UNAMID supplanted AMIS, France commented:
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[t]he coming months will be critical to responding to the high expectations 
elicited by today’s decision and to ensuring that Darfur is no longer, as it is today, 
a synonym for despair, distress and violence. Let us live up to the challenge by 
remaining united and by contributing to and cooperating jointly in this long-term 
effort. France is more than ever resolved to do so. (United Nations 2007q:5)
France also voted in favor o f the resolution renewing the UNAMID mandate that
included condemnation o f  al-Bashir, as noted in the previous chapter (United Nations
2008g; United Nations Security Council 2008).
The UK was a strong supporter o f the peace process in Darfur and aided in the
AMIS mission from early in the conflict (United Nations 2005q). In fact, the UK drafted
the transition to UNAMID resolution (S/RES/1706) (United Nations 2006p). When it
was passed, the UK stated that, “ [t]he resolution gives the United Nations force in Darfur
a clear Chapter VII mandate to use all necessary means to protect civilians” (United
Nations 2006n:3). Further, it explained that, “ [t]he United Kingdom was at the forefront
o f efforts to secure this [the R2P]. We are very pleased that this is the first Security
Council resolution mandating a United Nations peacekeeping operation to make an
explicit reference to this responsibility” (United Nations 2006n:4). A representative from
the United Kingdom stated that:
there is still a gaping hole in our ability to address the illegitimate threats and use 
o f force against innocent people. It is to our shame that the international 
community did not act in Rwanda. Darfur shows the urgent needs that yet have to 
be met. Today there are 28,000 African peacekeepers. But if  we are to honour 
[sic] our responsibility to protect behind borders where there are atrocities, we 
need to ensure more systematic support for peacekeepers, and we need to build 
the capacity o f vulnerable nations to prevent conflict. (United Nations 2008k:8)
Although the UK representative did not specifically call Darfur genocide here or in other
documents in the sample, there is inference in his statement through his reference to
Rwanda.
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Both France and the United Kingdom supported the referral to the ICC (United
Nations 2008g). The French representative stated: “ [i]ndeed, resolution 1593 (2005) is
based on the fact that the crimes committed in Darfur are o f  such gravity that, according
to the preamble o f  the Rome Statute, they threaten the peace, security and well-being o f
the world” (United Nations 20081:3).
While the referral to the ICC was shrouded in controversy at the P5, it was not
nearly as much as the indictment o f  al-Bashir -  both the first arrest warrants for crimes
against humanity and war crimes and the subsequent arrest warrant for genocide (see also
Chapter VI). A well-known point o f  contention for the RF was the indictment o f
President al-Bashir (United Nations 2008m). The RF representative explained:
we note that the ICC’s issuance o f a warrant for the arrest o f the President o f  the 
Sudan, Omer Al-Bashir [sic], does not contribute to a peaceful settlement in 
Darfur. It is well known that the African Union favours [sic] full guarantees for 
the safety and security o f the President o f  the Sudan: in other words, progress in 
the negotiations takes priority over the judicial process, because it is considered 
that activities under the slogan o f judicial fairness are undermining the ongoing 
peace process. And there can be no doubt that the process is ongoing, albeit with 
certain complications. (United Nations 2009c:6)
In another statement, the RF ended its remarks related to the ICC and Darfur with
“ [hjowever, we would call on him [Moreno-Ocampo] to carefully weigh his steps in his
work on Darfur and to calibrate them with the challenges o f  achieving peace and
improving the humanitarian situation” (United Nations 2009d:9).
The UK took issue with the condemnation o f  al-Bashir embedded in the
UNAMID mandate renewal resolution, explaining, “ [w]e will not stand in the way o f a
Security Council discussion o f  whether there is a case for invoking article 16 o f  the Rome
Statute in relation to President Al-Bashir [sic], but that discussion will raise profound
questions about the relationship between peace and justice” (United Nations 2008m:3).
101
A mere four months later, the UK was concerned about the lack o f action associated with
the ICC arrest warrant for crimes in the Darfur and urged Sudanese cooperation with the
ICC (United Nations 2009d). The UK voting behavior indicated the state desired a
balance between sovereignty and protection o f citizens in Darfur -  again, highlighting the
importance states place on their actions in relation to their vested interests, especially
when those contradict competing interests and moral obligations. One o f which was the
legitimacy, or perceived legitimacy o f  the UN and the UNSC, especially at a time when
calls had been made to completely restructure the UNSC, expanding the voting rights o f
global South states. Several discussions revolved around the idea that Darfur became a
critical issue in assessing whether the UNSC could remain relevant and effective-
legitimacy. In early 2007, the Slovakian representative stated:
[w]e believe that the emergence o f new threats to international peace and security 
requires the constant attention and regular adaptation o f the Security Council and 
its working methods to the new security environment. That is particularly true for 
some o f  the most daunting challenges, such as the upsurge in terrorism, the 
proliferation o f weapons o f mass destruction, and massive intra-State conflicts 
with the potential to destabilize entire regions, such as the crisis in Darfur. It is 
our joint responsibility to intensify our efforts to achieve tangible progress in our 
work, which should bring people more peace and security, better respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and greater prosperity. Words, 
statements and proclamations need to be transformed into practical measures, 
making a real difference on the ground. Otherwise, the entire United Nations 
system, including the Security Council, will lose its relevance and credibility. 
(United Nations 2007o:6)
Darfur began to be identified as a test for the existing structure and effective 
functioning o f the UN and UNSC as well as the organization’s legitimacy. When the 
UNSG explained that “[t]he most acute o f these challenges is, o f course, Darfur. Not 
only are innocent lives at stake, but also the authority o f  the Security Council, the image 
o f the United Nations in the Arab world and the credibility o f  the United Nations”
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(United Nations 2007m: 1). The word “Darfur” was one o f the 100 most searched words 
on the website o f  the United Nations in 2006, indicating that others were paying attention 
to the manner in which the situation was being addressed by the body, adding additional 
pressures for state action, resulting in the strain previously noted (United Nations 2004b).
SUMMARY
One document, the Report o f  the International Commission o f  Inquiry into Darfur 
(RICID), was the foundation o f  all UNSC actions. This 2005 report identified Darfur as 
crimes against humanity and this definition was never revisited despite mounting 
evidence o f genocide and arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court.
Data indicates that the RICID provided the opportunity for the UN and UNSC to state 
that responsibilities engendered by the UN Genocide Convention had been fulfilled, 
which permitted the body to navigate around the required intervention trigger in the 
Convention. The labeling o f the conflict as crimes against humanity rather than genocide 
rendered the Convention useless outside o f  the investigation and determination o f crimes 
against humanity. Use o f this definition allowed the UNSC to avoid required intervention 
while applying other interventions to the conflict. This single document provided the 
avenue for the UNSC to go through the motions but avoid meaningful and effective 
intervention in Darfur despite the calls for “no more” genocide after the Holocaust -  and 
Srebrenica -  and Rwanda. Realpolitik was evident in at least two members o f the UNSC 
P5 and was a useful in understanding the data at hand.
The central theme uniting the findings and theoretical components o f the 
integrated theory o f state crime may be summed as competing interests (Merton 1949;
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Rothe 2009b) -  morally, financially, in terms o f resources, and in terms o f  political will. 
Both individual states and organizations made up o f  individual states were trying to 
meets many goals and many needs at the same time (Merton 1949), and maintaining 
and/or increasing power and legitimacy was the primary mission. Cohen (1975) 
identified power as the central goal o f every state and the findings here buttressed that 
concept. Power was wielded both individually and by states collectively in UN and 
UNSC. The competing interests o f  morality versus legitimacy were also evident in the 
terms that Morgenthau (Bjola 2009; Kissinger 1977; Yunus 2003) described where 
morality was in the survival-of-the-fittest rather than a more traditional form o f morality. 
For states, morality was that which perpetuates the state itself at the current level or to an 
increasing level o f power and domination. The politics and pressures that states 
experienced at the international level diluted the individual level ideology and/or morality 
o f  protecting innocents in other states.
It is here that realpolitik (von Rochau 1972 [1853]) was seen in the data as the 
China and the US exhibited a focus on their own military, political, and economic 
supremacy at the cost o f  others. This neorealistic desire for domination and power 
dictated decisions made at the individual and collective level and indicated the states own 
self-interest above all else in decision-making in relation to the conflict in Darfur. The 
most strategic actions were those that maintain state power and all other decisions were 
made at the deference o f  that power (Wayman and Diehl 1994). Wayman and Diehl 
(1994) identify humanitarian interventions as the least strategic o f  state decisions, and the 
relegation o f these interventions fall victim to the lust for power and “domination 
relations” (Gumplowicz as cited in Aho 1975:49). Support for this concept was found in
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the data in relation to the lack o f  meaningful and effective intervention in Darfur. The 
morality o f effective intervention and protection o f life in Darfur simply could not 
compete with the other, more primal, and self-serving interests o f the P5 individually, 
which was also manifest in the collective decision-making o f the UN Security Council. 
Data indicates that the variable o f realpolitik exerted a great amount o f  influence on 
Chinese and US decision-making in relation to Darfur.
The data in this work provided a strong foundation for adding the variable 
realpolitik to the Rothe (2009b) integrated theory o f state crime model. It proved to have 
explanatory power o f state reactions to the behavior o f other states, especially in relation 
to the economic and political interests o f China and the political and military interests o f 
the US. It was also central to placing the decision-making discourse by the UN and 
UNSC into context and understanding why such decisions were made. Adding the 
variable to the model and uniting the international relations and criminological literature 
allows bridges to be built between the two bodies o f literature. In some instances these 
bodies o f work may be far apart; as evidenced in this project, the two are critically related 
and the bridges between the bodies o f literature will only strengthen the explanatory 
power o f both in situations like Darfur and other conflicts.
Likewise, the perceived definition o f the situation impacted voting behavior, 
though at times, as noted above, they contradicted each other, drawing on terms such as 
sovereignty and governmental consent. The perceived definition o f the situation dictated 
the labeling and the labeling was the center o f the discourse analysis here. The focus on 
crimes against humanity and war crimes based on the RICID findings dictated decision­
making behavior from that point forward. The definition o f  the situation remained
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unchanged from two years into the conflict despite how the conflict evolved over time 
and outcries from the public and NGO to act during the protracted violence.
These activist and NGO demands for greater intervention into Darfur caused 
strain for the UN and P5. Each o f  the P5 had their own self-interests that required 
balancing with decisions related to the conflict. These competing interests, as noted 
above, indicated that the P5 used realpolitik to ensure that their own state interests were 
satisfied before becoming involved in the needs o f  other states. At times, this meant 
words o f support and encouragement without financial or military support. At other 
times this strain was manifest in protection o f  economic interests despite the violence in 
the region.
This strain also led to a diffusion o f responsibility. These strained P5 members 
could state their desires to aid the victims o f Darfur and to stop the violence in the region 
without being required to put action behind the words. P5 members who continually 
voted in ways that indicated realpolitik and primacy o f  their own self-interests meant that 
some P5 states could do nothing more than express concern and desire for more 
meaningful interventions. This diffusion o f responsibility allowed states to practice 
realpolitik and to pacify any demands o f their own constituency to intervene by making a 
vocal effort for intervention despite the diffusion o f  responsibility and dilution o f 
individual votes when a P5 consensus was required on important measures.
This P5 consensus and diffusion o f individual responsibility that is inherent 
therein is vital to this work and is an area in which policy change would make the UNSC 
function more effectively. The following chapter will discuss additional implications 
from this analysis in terms o f  policy.
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CHAPTER VIII 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
This work has led to two major policy implications: the Genocide Convention is 
useless due to the way in which it was written and the UNSC requires restructuring to 
avoid the realpolitik that permeates its current structure.
The Genocide Convention is a utopian document written on the heels o f  the 
Holocaust, a time in which emotions were high, as were demands for accountability and 
assurances that such atrocities would “never again” be permitted. There have been 
several genocides since and none have effectively invoked the Genocide Convention for 
protection o f those harmed. The Rwandan genocide entailed the death o f 800,000 in the 
short span o f three months. Darfur was, and continues to be, the slow death o f hundreds 
o f thousands over the course o f a decade. If  the Genocide Convention cannot address 
either, it is useless in its current form.
The Genocide Convention was first invoked in Darfur (United Nations 2004aj). 
This work explained in detail, in many ways, how little that meant. The investigation 
under the Convention labeled the crime in a way as to prevent further action. Even 
International Criminal Court arrest warrants for genocide provoked no further action by 
the UNSC. The Genocide Convention was written in a way that ties its hands and makes 
the document ineffective. The required intervention trigger means nothing if  simply 
naming the conflict something other than it is allows circumnavigation o f the document -  
as was the case in Darfur.
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New mechanisms for addressing genocide are required. Since the cries o f “never 
again” after the Holocaust and the creation o f the United Nations Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment o f the Crime o f Genocide (1948), genocide occurred in 
Bosnia, Cambodia, Rwanda, and now in Darfur. Some scholars would also include 
Burundi and Uganda, among others. The Responsibility to Protect shows promise but if 
not effectively administered, it could end in the same fate as the Convention -  moral and 
utopian in ideal and supported by many, but with no teeth and completely unenforceable. 
The R2P can be seen as an ideology that reduces the strain experienced by the practice o f 
realpolitik in lieu o f  competing interests. The R2P is merely a document that states that 
certain behaviors by states are unacceptable and should be prevented/stopped/punished. 
Without clear dictates as to when intervention is required and what types o f  interventions 
are permitted, the R2P is merely a broader and updated version o f  the Genocide 
Convention. Without such specific alterations, the R2P document itself and the ideology 
behind it are as easily circumvented through labeling o f  conflicts at the international level 
as was the Genocide Convention in this case.
The Genocide Convention and the R2P are not the only problems. The current 
structure o f the UNSC has many flaws that impede its efficacy. More specifically, the 
UNSC is structured in a way that gives much power to a few and places major decisions 
related to conflict intervention and other matters in the hands o f the most powerful states 
in the world -  China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom o f Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States o f America. Certain decisions by the 
group require an affirmative vote from all five o f  these permanent members o f  the 
Security Council. A simple abstention, or declining to vote, renders the Council unable
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to proceed on such matters. The Report o f the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change in 2004 explained that:
[t]he biggest failures o f  the United Nations in civil violence have been in halting 
ethnic cleansing and genocide. In Rwanda, Secretariat officials failed to provide 
the Security Council with early warning o f extremist plans to kill thousands o f 
Tutsi s and moderate Hutus. When the genocide started, troop contributors 
withdrew peacekeepers, and the Security Council, bowing to United States 
pressure, failed to respond. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, United Nations 
peacekeeping and the protection o f humanitarian aid became a substitute for 
political and military action to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide. In Kosovo, 
paralysis in the Security Council led the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) to bypass the United Nations. Only in one instance in the 1990s - in East 
Timor - did the Security Council, urged on by the Secretary-General, work 
together with national Governments and regional actors to apply concerted 
pressure swiftly to halt large-scale killing. (United Nations 2004x:34)
Similarly, the UN Secretary-General’s report on the events in Srebrenica detailed failures
by the UN and international community in the prevention or stoppage o f  the conflict in
Srebrenica. It described a:
gulf between mandate and m eans... pervasive ambivalence within the United Nations 
regarding the role o f force in the pursuit o f  peace....an institutional ideology o f 
impartiality even when confronted with attempted genocide... range o f doctrinal and 
institutional issues that go to the heart o f  the United Nations ability to keep the peace 
and help protect civilian populations from armed conflict. (United Nations 
1999b: 108)
In Rwanda, “[t]here was a persistent lack o f  political will by Member States to act, or to 
act with enough assertiveness. This lack o f  political will affected the response by the 
Secretariat and decision-making by the Security Council” (United Nations 1999a:3). All 
o f  these statements indicated that the power placed in the hands o f a few, with their own 
national agendas and self-interests at heart, leaves those being harmed by their 
governments to suffer while the UNSC debates. In the case o f  Darfur, the debate 
continues despite the hundreds o f thousands killed and millions displaced. The position 
o f the P5 may be explained in this way: “ [i]f you can exploit the UN to your own
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national advantage then do so; otherwise keep it at arm ’s length to avoid unwelcome 
constraints” (Simons 1995:57).
Totten (2013:219) sums the role o f realpolitik, state reaction, and the P5 in this 
manner:
many, if not most, o f the P5’s votes regarding intervention in genocide in the past 
have been driven by realpolitik. In other words, the P5 have not been concerned 
primarily with the fate o f the potential victims o f genocide but much more 
focused on whether intervening would be good for themselves or their allies. As 
the cliche goes, nation states do not have consciences. Concomitantly, the type o f 
mission— Chapter VI (peacekeeping) or Chapter VII (peace enforcement) o f  the 
Charter o f  the United Nations— is largely dictated by the P5 as well. Thus, instead 
o f sending a robust mission in a timely fashion with a mandate that allows the 
mission’s troops to handle a job  properly, the P5 play politics and often approve 
missions that are sorely inadequate for the job. This is true for a whole host o f 
reasons, but the main point here is that the P5 virtually take on the God-like role 
o f deciding who will live and who will die.
This type o f concentrated power in the hands o f a few means that important international
decisions may not be the result o f  broader international consensus.
To effectively maintain international peace and security, the UNSC must be
restructured to balance the power o f the Council overall. The ten rotating members allow
states that may not have great amount o f power internationally to have a role and to play
a part in the organization that seeks to serve all members, while also no longer catering to
the most powerful nations. The rotating o f  the ten also permits a variety o f viewpoints
and ideas to come to bear at the Council. Simply allowing all 15 members o f  the UNSC
to vote on all matters and changing the consensus requirement o f all P5 states on certain
matters would easily distribute the power more evenly and require little to no change
other than during voting. Alternately, all UNGA members could get a vote -  one per
country -  with a majority vote required for a matter to be approved. These two could
also be combined with the majority o f  the 15 UNSC and a majority o f  the UNGA
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required to pass important measures. Either o f these options makes the UNSC function 
more equitably and takes the power from the few and spreads it more evenly to the many.
This more equitable distribution o f  voting power at the UNSC (and possible 
inclusion o f the UNGA) means that states that rely on realpolitik have a diluted impact on 
decision-making. The international relations body o f literature makes it clear that states 
will protect themselves and their interests first. However, some o f  the smaller states will 
have less interest to protect, which may make them more open to intervention when 
needed rather than the diffusion o f  responsibility seen in the current P5 consensus model.
The current P5 structure is made up o f  the wealthiest and most well protected 
states. The data here indicates that this colors their voting through the lens o f  realpolitik. 
Permitting Rwanda or Burundi or Yugoslavia to vote on how to react to massive 
violations o f human rights gives those with first-hand experience o f such violence a voice 
in preventing it from happening to others. Smaller states may not be as focused on self­
protection and protection o f  sovereignty as the wealthiest P5. This permits the voice o f 
the many to speak rather than just the voice o f the most powerful. Diluting the voting 
power o f  the wealthiest and most powerful would surely bring a new focus to the UNSC 
and impact decision-making. The United Nations was established after the Holocaust to 
unite states to prevent similar events from occurring. The current structure o f  the P5 and 
required consensus prevents that. The data indicates that the P5 are focused on self­
protection -  specifically the protection o f their power and legitimacy. Not all states have 
this hyper-focus on sovereignty, power, and legitimacy. States with less power and 
wealth do not have to spend as much time and energy protecting such interests at the 
international level as do the P5 states. Allowing all states to unite in voting at the United
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Nations would surely bring more equity, as well as reducing the current reliance on 
realpolitik and sovereignty at all costs that were evident in the P5 discourse and decision­
making throughout this sample.
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Future research in this area may explore conflicts comparable to Darfur to 
determine if  similar conclusions are drawn. Research into the UN and UNSC labeling 
and discourse related to Rwanda (before the conflict was posthumously determined to be 
genocide) may be interesting to compare and contrast to this work. Additionally, 
conflicts such as Kosovo or Syria may be o f  interest to understand if  the contextual 
discourse related is similar to the findings here. The world is filled with conflict, thus 
works that may be compared and contrasted to the findings here may be found in every 
decade previously and, without change to the current way in which the conflicts are 
addressed, in decades to come. This may provide the opportunity to determine if  the 
findings here are generalizable to similar conflicts.
In that vein, additional research may also delve into ways in which conflicts are 
identified and labeled domestically by the P5 in comparison to how the same conflicts are 
identified by those same members at the UN and UNSC. For example, the US called 
Darfur genocide in Congress and in the UN. Future research may uncover some 
disconnect in the manner in which conflicts are identified domestically because there are 
no repercussions to those labels, versus those that have repercussions in the international 
arena at the UNSC.
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Finally, future research may focus on NGOs/IGOs and their impact on the 
definitional process at the UNSC. Many o f  these organizations made statements at the 
UN identifying Darfur as genocide. However, this did not appear to impact the decision­
making by the group. Projects focused on the international impact, or lack thereof, o f 
these organizations may be able to place the groups in a better position to leverage any 
influence that they may have at the UNSC. These groups are not bound by international 
politics and focus on human rights as their sole mission. Their ability to bring data to the 
UNSC and help the group make better-informed decisions that are less driven by politics 
and realpolitik may aid in ending future conflicts before they rise to the level o f  genocide 
and millions o f lives are lost.
CONCLUSION
The overarching conclusion o f this work may be best summed in this way:
“[wjhen you see that the advisor thinks more about him self than about you, and that in all 
his deeds he seeks his own self-interest, such a man as this will never be a good adviser 
and you will never be able to trust him” (Machiavelli [1532] 1979:154-5). The UNSC 
exhibited realpolitik and self-serving behavior in many ways throughout the data. They 
used Bourdieu’s ([1982] 2003:164) “symbolic power [of language]...that invisible power 
which can be exercised only with the complicity o f  those who do not want to know that 
they are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it.” Machiavelli ([1532] 1979) 
raises an important point -  in this context, if  those tasked with maintenance o f 
international peace and security place their own state-interests first in decision-making, 
how can the world trust such decision-makers?
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FULL LIST OF DOCUMENTS (n=390)
Date UN Document Number/Identification
08/02/02 A/57/326
03/17/03 E/CN.4/2003/NGO/188
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09/19/08 Press Conference on Developments Relating to 
International Criminal Court Investigation in Darfur, Role 












02/18/09 A /H RC/10/30
02/19/09 S/2009/100
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AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan
AU African Union
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DPA Darfur Peace Agreement
EU European Union
HRW Human Rights Watch
GoS Government o f Sudan
ICC International Criminal Court
ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGO Intergovernmental Organization(s)
GoNU Government o f National Unity
IDP Internally Displaced People
JEM Justice and Equality Movement
MINURCAT United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad 
NGO Nongovernmental Organization(s)
OAU Organization o f  African Unity (also known as the African Union)
P5 Permanent Five
R2P Responsibility to Protect
RAF Rwandan Armed Forces
RICID Report on the International Commission o f Inquiry into Darfur
RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front
RF Russian Federation
SLA Sudan Liberation Army
SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
UK United Kingdom o f Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN United Nations
UNBISNET United Nations Bibliographic Information System 
UNCHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNGC United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the
Crime o f Genocide 
UNHCHR United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights
UNODS United Nation Official Document System
UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNAMID African Union -  United Nation Mission in Darfur
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSG United National Secretary-General
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US United States o f America
WSOD World Summit Outcome Document
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APPENDIX C 
PERMISSION TO USE COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL
On Fri, Sep 19, 2014 at 2:04 PM, Patrick Abbott < patrick.abbott@ gmail.com> wrote:
Dr. Overton,
By all means! I consider anything on the blog fair game for any citation. If  you have 
any further issues feel free to contact me. By the way, I won't blog about it but could you 
send me a copy o f your dissertation? It sounds interesting! Thanks for reaching out!
-Patrick Abbott
909 New Jersey Ave SE - Unit 417 
Washington, DC 20003-5305 
(202)355-3979
On Fri, Sep 19, 2014 at 1:00 PM, Angela Overton <aoverton@gsu.edu> wrote:
Hello.
I wrote my dissertation on UN non-intervention into the genocide in Darfur. I used the 
map image on this page http://www.geographictravels.com/2011/07/south-sudan-worlds- 
newest-country.html. I did credit you as the source. However, now my university is 
requiring that I obtain your permission to use it in my dissertation. May I include the 
map, with your permission?
Please advise with questions. Thank you.
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